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DYNAMIC CHANGE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN A CANADIAN
MARKET ECONOMY:
SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
By W. T. STANBURY*
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide both a useful summary and a
critique of the recent report by Messrs. Skeoch and McDonald to the Depart-
ment of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.'
Their report provided a series of policy proposals for the Stage II amend-
ments to the Combines Investigation Act2 which were introduced into Parlia-
ment in March 1977. Dr. Skeoch, Mr. McDonald and a committee of three,
two senior business executives and a lawyer associated with small business,
were asked to deal with mergers, monopolization, price discrimination, loss-
leader selling, rationalization and export agreements and interlocking direc-
torates. They have reported on these and other matters, including basing-point
pricing, intellectual and industrial property and, in much more detail, on the
© Copyright, 1976, W. T. Stanbury.
* W. T. Stanbury is an Associate Professor of Policy Analysis, Faculty of Com-
merce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of the Journal's editors in preparing this article for
publication.
'Lawrence A. Skeoch with Bruce C. McDonald (in consultation with Michel
Belanger, Reuben M. Bromstein, and William 0. Twaits), Dynamic Change and Ac-
countability in a Canadian Market Economy (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
Canada, 1976) 361 pp.
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as amended by c. 10 (1st Supp.); c. 10 (2nd Supp.); 1974-
75-76, c. 76. See, Proposals for a New Competition Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Con-
sumer and Corporate Affairs, 1977).
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administrative and adjudicative details relating to their proposed amendments
to the Combines Investigation Act.
1. Some Historical Perspective
Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian Market Economy
represents a major policy input into the process of reforming Canada's com-
petition policy. This process began in July of 1966 when the Government of
Canada requested the Economic Council of Canada to prepare a report on,
among other things, "combines, mergers, monopolies and restriaint of trade."8
Two years later, the Council published its Interim Report on Competition
Policy,4 in which it proposed major revisions to the Combines Investigation
Act. On June 29, 1971 the Government introduced Bill C-256, the Competi-
tion Act, in the House of Commons and it was given first reading. It was a
large and complex bill, containing some 103 sections and was 106 pages long.8
Compared to the existing laws on restraint of trade, the Competition Act
represented a large discontinuous change in the environment of Canadian
businessmen. Their reaction was predominantly negative. Five months after
the Act was introduced, the Financial Post observed, "[n]ot since the early
days of the great tax debate has a single government proposal aroused the ire
of the business community to the extent the Competition Act has." Early in
1972, it was announced that a revised bill would be re-introduced and that
it would incorporate substantial changes in light of business' representations.
In the House of Commons on July 18, 1973 Herb Gray, the fourth Minister of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs in five and one-half years, announced that
Canada's new competition policy would be implemented in stages. On No-
vember 7, 1973 a series of amendments to the Combines Investigation Act
was given first reading in the House of Commons. This bill (C-227, later C-7
and C-2) was described as Stage I7 and became law effective January 1,
1976.8
The Stage I amendments include a number of important changes to the
Act.9 For the first time since 1935, services are to come within the purview
3 Press Release, Privy Council Office, July 22, 1966.
4 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1969) 244 pp.
5 The bill was accompanied by a 137 page volume entitled, The Competition Act:
Explanatory Notes (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1971)
(mimeo).
6 The Financial Post, December 11, 1971 at 1.
, The original bill is contained in, Proposals for a New Competition Policy for
Canada, First Stage (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1973).
8 Section 32 of the new Combines Investigation Act became applicable to services
on July 1, 1976.
9 The 1975 amendments are discussed in some detail in: W.T. Stanbury, ed., Papers
on the 1975 Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act (Vancouver: Faculty of
Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, 1976); Gordon
Kaiser, The New Competition Law: Stage One (1976), 1 Canadian Business Law Journal
147; Background Papers: Stage 1, Competition Policy, Bureau of Competition Policy
(Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1976) (mimeo). A short but
useful description is contained in Report of the Director of Investigation and Research,
Combines Investigation Act for the year ended March 31, 1976 (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, Canada, 1976) at 9-14.
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of the Act.'0 The amendments grant a civil jurisdiction to the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission (RTPC) to review certain trade practices which
may be desirable or undesirable depending on the facts in specific cases. The
RTPC is given the power to make remedial orders with respect to consignment
selling, exclusive dealing, tied selling, refusal to deal and market restrictions.
The RTPC has also been given jurisdiction, where Canadian firms are ad-
versely affected, to review the implementation of foreign judgments or orders,
the refusal to supply by foreign suppliers, and the implementation of foreign
laws considered binding on a Canadian subsidiary by its foreign parent.
The amendments provide for the institution of private civil suits for
single damages in respect of the Act's criminal offences and in respect of
violations of the RTPC's orders or a court's order. While the term "unduly"
remains in the conspiracy section, a new section prevents the application of
the "virtual monopoly doctrine." Bid-rigging is made illegal per se, unless the
arrangement is made known to the person requesting the bids or tenders.
The most extensive set of amendments in Stage I relates to misleading
advertising and deceptive trade practices. All representations, in any form
whatsoever, that are false or misleading in a material respect are prohibited,
substantially broadening the section. Tests and testimonials must be accurate
and the permission to use them must be obtained. Where double-ticketing
occurs, the product must be offered for sale at the lower price. Inducements
to participate in a pyramid or referral selling scheme are prohibited, except
for those that are registered in a province in which the inducements are made.
Bait and switch selling is prohibited and any product advertised at a bargain
price must be available for sale in reasonable quantities. A seller is not liable
where he can establish that the non-availability of the product was due to
circumstances beyond his control or that a reasonable substitute was offered.
Sales of a product by a seller at a price higher than his currently advertised
price is prohibited, unless the advertised price is an error and is immediately
corrected. Promotional contests must now disclose information on the number
and value of prizes and any information relating to the chances of winning a
contest that does not select participants or distribute prizes on the basis of
skill or on a random basis.
The section on resale price maintenance is also strengthened. It now
prohibits any attempt to influence upward or discourage the reduction of the
selling or advertised price of an article. A supplier must now make it clear
to his customers that any price suggested by him is just that and the customer
has no obligations to sell at that price. The refusal to supply provision is
broadened to include other forms of discrimination that might be used to
induce a supplier's customers to maintain prices. It is also an offence for a
customer of a supplier to induce the supplier to refuse to sell to other custom-
ers because of their low pricing policy.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE DYNAMIC CHANGE REPORT
The main thesis (described modestly as an hypothesis) of the Commit-
tee's report is stated as follows:
10 Since s. 34(1) (a), dealing with price discrimination, retains the word "articles"
(rather than "product" which includes services) it does not apply to services.
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the role of government policy should be not to direct and manage the economy
in detail but to facilitate change and thus release and reinvigorate the dynamic
forces that have been responsible for the prodigious economic growth that the
market-directed, private enterprise system has demonstrated it is capable of
achieving."
The authors see their policy proposals as those which "will most effectively
facilitate long-run dynamic change within the Canadian economy, that will
encourage the adoption of real-cost economies, and that will discourage re-
straints which will result from mere market power rather than superior
economic performance."''
The report can be properly characterized in terms of the following
themes:
1) A Systems View of the Economy
At the outset, Skeoch and McDonald argue that "the market economy
involves an organic and historical process that conditions developments over
the entire economy"; 13 they repeatedly emphasize "the interconnection of the
various elements in the total economy.' 4 The authors criticize the element of
"hypochondria" and "over-simplification" in recent Canadian economic policy.
They assert that, "there is no fundamental analysis of how the problems are
inter-related and how the proposed remedies would interact and affect the
economic system as a whole."'15 Throughout the report, in assessing the
alternatives, they request the policy-maker to "take into account the larger
social and economic perspective."'16
2) Emphasis on Facilitating the Process of Change
Skeoch and McDonald wish to "release and reinvigorate the dynamic
forces" which they see as the key to economic growth in the context of a
private enterprise economy. Beginning with the title of the report, they stress
that the objective of competition policy should be to facilitate the process of
economic change. However, "[t]he benefits from dynamic change 7 will ...
only materialize in the long run as industry gradually exploits opportunities
for economies of scale, for organizational innovations, and for improvements
in management efficiency."' 8 They believe that the job of the policy-maker is
to "encourage the private sector to adopt patterns of conduct that will promote
dynamic change and avoid artificial restraints."'19 In particular, "[t]he problem
"I Supra, note 1 at 202.
12 Id. at ii.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 29.
'.6 d. at 324.
.7 Perhaps the linking of the words "dynamic change" has been done for emphasis,
but the modifier "dynamic" appears to be redundant. "Dynamic," according to a diction-
ary, is defined to be "of or pertaining to forces not in equilibrium, or in motion as the
result of force" and as "producing or involving change or action."
I8 Supra, note 1 at 36.
19 Id. at 23.
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is how to facilitate the process of change by policies of general application
and at the same time to assist the individual to adjust to the changes that do
occur."
20
Four years earlier, with respect to the Competition Act, Professor Skeoch
expressed the same view as that adopted in the report:
[rThe central focus of policy relating to industrial organization should be to
promote dynamic change and growth through encouraging flexibility and adapt-
ability in the economy. Such a policy must emphasize not the efficient allocation
of existing resources among alternative uses in terms of keeping down costs and
profits, but the encouragement of new methods of production and distribution,
the development of new institutions for liberating and expanding the growth
opportunities in the economy.2 1
The clarion cry seems to be: "Let the market work." As Skeoch and
McDonald reiterate in the report, they have "a longer-run outlook based on
the encouragement of adaptibility and flexibility directed to the achievement
of real-cost economies through a market system, and the curbing of artificial
restraints, that is, those not based on superior economic performance."22
3) Minimal Interventionism
The authors may be described as small "c" conservatives with respect
to government intervention in the economy. They are reluctant to see the
government intervene at all. Alternatively, one can view them as nineteenth
century liberals holding that "the government which governs best, governs
least." They assert the present validity of Adam Smith's strictures on govern-
ment that, "governments are inherently inefficient in administration because
their agents are paid out of state funds and not out of the proceeds of suc-
cessful administration." 23 With respect to government intervention, Skeoch
and McDonald again use Smith to set the tone of their approach by saying
"that state intervention tends to result in large and enduring errors, whereas
the errors of free economic enterprise in addition to being more transient...
and of smaller scale, are likely to neutralize one another.
'24
The authors provide the counsel of age and experience; such counsel
shows a cynical appreciation of the imperfections of men and the institutions
through which they wield power. They espouse a "system in which there are
checks and balances which limit the opportunities for any individual to make
decisions which affect the whole system." 25 In particular, "[tihe system
should be devised in such a way that extreme views and incompetent in-
dividuals have the least possible chance of doing harm." 26 Thus, we are
20 Id. at 10.
2 1 L. A. Skeoch, "Basic Economic and Policy Considerations," in L. A. Skeoch, ed.,
Canadian Competition Policy (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University,
1972) at 8.
22 Supra, note 1 at 224.
23 Id. at 14.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 15-16.
26 Id. at 17.
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offered the dynamic possibilities of the market as a means to achieve both our
economic and political goals.
When the government must intervene, Skeoch and McDonald want it to
keep a "low profile." Perhaps because they also advocate respect for the
systemic view, they see the "need for caution in tinkering with the institutional
and organizational structure of the economy."127 The report advocates "a
general presumption against government interference in the normal operations
of the economy, which extends to mergers and other aspects of competition
policy."28 They assert, "[m]arket economies cannot be fine-tuned."' 29 Con-
sequently, their approach to policy is to "grope forward by means of methods
which are as general as possible."30
Skeoch and McDonald see changes in competition policy laws as es-
sentially a burden on business firms. "We should be very clear about the
justification before we impose additional burdens on the business community,
especially at a time when it is being urged to become more enterprising and
productive."31 The authors remind us "that improvement is at best slow" and
that "we all live under the cold star of scarcity.13 2 They urge a "balanced"
and long-term view of competition policy problems.
The logical extension of both the systemic and intervention-minimizing
views is that the policy-maker's role be constrained and that the power to
effect public policy be decentralized. This is evident in a number of the re-
port's recommendations. For example, it is recommended that the Director
of Investigation and Research not be given the power to prosecute criminal
cases independently of the Department of Justice. "[C]riminal prosecution
itself is so serious that an independent check on the single-minded enthusiasm
of the investigators and policy makers might on rare occasion be a useful
safeguard."3 3 Similarly, the authors propose that the orders of their quasi-
judicial tribunal (the National Markets Board) be appealable to the Cabinet.
This is advocated in terms of the "need for a safety valve," the necessity for
"over-riding coordination of national policies" and the requirement that "raw
political questions"34 be ultimately in the hands of elected officials.
C. SUMMAARY OF THE REPORT
1. Merger Policy
The report endorses what might be called a real-economies theory of
mergers rather than one based primarily on capital market opportunities (im-
perfections), tax considerations and stock market enthusiasm. Skeoch and
271d. at 8.
28 Id. at 307.
29 Id. at 300.
3o ld. at 17.
31 Id. at 326.
321d. at 29.
33Id. at 319.
34 Id. at 314.
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McDonald are concerned to understand the relationship between the number
and type of mergers and technological variables, marketing policy, the rate of
market growth, effects of barriers to entry and changes in costs. While en-
dorsing this most useful analytical approach, they offer no new analysis of
their own, and appear to base their policy proposals, at least in part, upon
the work of Reuber and Roseman,3 5 whose analysis concentrated on the
period 1945 to 1961.
The authors conclude that "it would appear that the general merger
movement in Canada has not given rise to any important consequences for the
economy."'36 This statement is accompanied by a footnote, which cites the
following words from the Book of Job: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by
words without knowledge?" Having drawn the conclusion that mergers have
not had important consequences for the Canadian economy, they endorse "a
more sophisticated analysis" of mergers. They recognize that Canadian data is
"seriously inadequate" for determining "the degree to which mergers were
affecting the 'structure' of similar industry sub-divisions . .. [or] whether the
different countries involved in the comparisons were undergoing a similar
cross-sectional merger experience. '8 7 Despite these admissions, Skeoch and
McDonald draw a fairly strong conclusion that "a significant proportion of
domestic mergers constitute [sic] a response to specific functional influences of
international reach."
38
The report states that the preferred approach to merger policy is "to alter
the reaction pattern of the economy so as to promote economic development
and dynamic change rather than to attempt to 'fine tune' merger policy in such a
way as to sort out comprehensively and with precision the mergers that are
undertaken."39 Skeoch and McDonald argue that the jurisprudence derived
from the only two contested prosecutions, R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd.
40
and R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Company Ltd.,41 "provides little
assistance in formulating merger policy"'' because of the "distressing ir-
relevance" 48 of the criteria used by the judges to determine the legality of
the mergers.
As the basis for their policy proposals, they state that the thrust of
merger policy should be
(1) to permit the growth of firms (even involving the reduction of the number
of firms) based on real-cost economies, including static economies of scale,
35 Grant L. Reuber and Frank Roseman, The Take-Over of Canadian Firms, 1945-
61, Special Study No. 10, Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1969).
3 6 Supra, note 1 at 56.
37 Id. at 58.
38 Id. at 68.
39 Id. at 70.
40 R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960] O.R. 601; 33 C.R. 1; 126 C.C.C. 133; 34
C.P.R. 179.
41 R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. (1960), 32 W.W.R. 577; 129
C.C.C. 7; (1962), 38 C.P.R. 177; 36 C.R. 32.
4 2 Supra, note 1 at 70.
4 3 Id. at 71.
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but emphasizing those advantages relating to technological progress, product
variation and organizational change; and
(2) to discourage expansion of firm size (or the maintenance of firm size against
new entrants) which results from the exploitation of artificial restraints. 44
Implementation of their policy involves a four-stage process of evaluation.
The first stage is the identification of "significant" mergers. The central ele-
ment in analyzing the impact of a merger, the report asserts, "is the identifica-
tion of the pertinent market within which it occurs. ' 40 This can only be doie
in the context of the specific problem under consideration. However, "[tihe
basic principle is to take full account of competition among products and of
the position of buyers as well as sellers. '46
The second main element in the identification of significant mergers is
the analysis of the structure of the market for the purpose of assessing the
degree of market power possessed by the merging firms.4T Skeoch and Mc-
Donald emphasize that in addition to the usual elements of market structure
(concentration, product differentiation, barriers to entry, the rate of growth
of demand, the price elasticity of demand and the ratio of fixed to variable
costs) it is important to assess the "extent to which dynamic change is oc-
curring in the market." 48 As a "first approximation" in determining the sig-
nificance of a merger, consideration should be given to barriers to entry, the
rate of growth of demand and the nature and extent of dynamic change.
The authors recognize the possibility of a "failing firm" exemption, but
also note the prophylactic effect of business failures on the adjustment process.
With respect to share of market as a criterion, they assert it is of limited
relevance in the small Canadian economy. They do, however, recognize its
value in defining minimum levels of significance.
The second stage in the public policy analysis of mergers (assuming that
they are economically significant) is the assessment of the primary con-
sequences of the merger. These refer to the "probable impact of the merger
in strengthening or creating artificial restraints. '49 Such restraints include the
possession of scarce natural resources, patents or licences or contracts relating
to some specific technology, discriminatory vertical reciprocal buying/selling
arrangements and discriminatory arrangements with labour unions. Skeoch
and McDonald emphasize that this list or any other cannot be made ex-
haustive. They also point out that it may be the combination of restraints
which results in the adverse impact. In line with their emphasis on competition
as a dynamic process, they stress that a proposed merger must not strengthen
barriers to entry to the industry or industries involved.
If the analysis of the primary merger consequences is unfavourable to the
proposed merger it becomes necessary to assess the secondary consequences
44 Id. at 72.
4 5 Id. at 84.
46 Id. at 85.
47 Id. at 86.
48 Id.
4 9 Id. at 88.
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of the merger. In this, the third stage of the evaluation process, the analysis
is concerned with longer-ran considerations. These include barriers to entry,
real-cost economies (both in production and in selling and distribution) and
factors promoting dynamic change both within and among firms. The report
emphasizes that "the analysis would not attempt to establish 'specific actuali-
ties' but to forecast and appraise reasonable probabilities." 50 Where the
secondary consequences of the merger offset the disadvantages of the primary
consequences, the merger would be approved. If not, the fourth stage in the
evaluation process becomes operative.
Stage four involves "examining the possibility of altering the reaction
pattern of the industry by changes in the economic environment." 51 Such
changes might involve reductions in tariffs, the divestiture of part of the
merger firm, the substitution of a joint venture for all or part of the merger,
and the licencing of patents. The Director of Investigation and Research
would be responsible for negotiating such changes, and any agreement would
have to be approved by the proposed National Markets Board.52
The authors defend their four-stage, case-by-case evaluation process by
arguing that a non-discretionary approach, incorporating concentration or
profit rate criteria, would obscure rather than illuminate the essential issues.
For example, they point out that a low profit rate may conceal market power
expressed in the form of inefficiency in production and distribution. They also
note that reliance on one or two measures of market effectiveness could result
in overlooking a combination of secondary factors. In short, they argue, there
is no real substitute for informed judgment.
Skeoch and McDonald see the Canadian economy as increasingly in-
tegrated in the global economic system. Multinational enterprises "possess
either special skills or strong public reputations which can give them an
important edge when they attempt to enter a foreign market. ' 53 As a result,
they may be able to pay more for local firms than domestic investors. Given
their emphasis on "dynamic change," they are obviously concerned with the
impact of foreign investment in Canada on research and development and the
process of innovation. They assert:
The Canadian view apparently holds that foreign-owned subsidiaries do little
research in Canada and, as a result, discourage the development of a research
and development "industry" in Canada, and, in consequence, make more difficult
the growth of a sophisticated manufacturing sector here.
54
They argue that there is not much evidence to support such a view and that
government efforts to encourage R & D have been both expensive and in-
effective. Skeoch and McDonald argue at some length that the conclusion of
a U.K. study, to the effect that the alternative to developing an independent
50 d. at 89.
51 ld.
52 The nature and functions of the National Markets Board are discussed below.
See text, inIra, following note 124.
5 3 Supra, note 1 at 97.
Id. at 100.
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European technological community is economic decline and domination by
the U.S., "is wrong, and misleadingly over-simplified." 5 They strongly imply
that the same is true for Canada. The public policy issue, as they see it, is
"that in manufacturing and high-technology production the new-product
oligopoly will continue to be the most important market form in the fore-
seeable future. ' " The developments which will influence the manufacturing
and high technology industries will be international - unless inhibited by
government intervention. What is a good merger policy in this context? It
"involves the relevant agency in predicting the longer-run effects of certain
limitations on (or extensions of) the firm's planned production and marketing
designs within a non-static framework.
57
The essence of the correct policy, say the authors, is to "avoid detailed
tinkering with elements of structure and behaviour and should rely primarily
on eliminating artificial restraints and on maintaining pressure for adjustment
from as many directions as is feasible .... "
5 8
The report is sharply critical of the evaluation of mergers by the Foreign
Investment Review Agency. As the authors see it, FIRA has "no well-
developed theory... of industrial and market behaviour and performance in
the domestic-international context to guide and illuminate decisions for the
private sector and to test the validity of decisions made by the enforcement
agency."59 They see FIRA's stated criteria as "unduly concerned with short-
run considerations" and as taking the form of ad hoc intervention in matters
of detail. 60 In addition, they note, the ten criteria are "riddled with am-
biguity," especially those specifying "improved productivity and industrial
efficiency," "innovation" and "enhance[d] technological development."
01
Skeoch and McDonald can see no merit in handling inward foreign mergers
any differently than domestic mergers. They strongly recommend that if their
proposals with respect to domestic mergers are adopted, "the same method
should apply to all forms of inward foreign mergers, partial mergers and quasi-
mergers."'
2. Monopoly and the Abuse of Monopoly Power
Skeoch and McDonald begin by pointing out that the existence of
monopoly and the exercise of monopoly power are not recent phenomena;
nor are they associated with bigness in absolute terms. They find much to
agree with in the statement that all levels of government have been the creators
and protectors of monopoly: "it would ... have to be conceded that gov-
ernment-sponsored restraints have accounted for many of the worst examples
55 Id. at 102.
56 1d. at 105.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 105-06.
59 1d. at 106.
60 Id. at 108.
61 1d. at 111.
62 Id. at 112.
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in the rogues' gallery of restrictive practices." The report states that mo-
nopoly elements in the private sector can be kept within reasonable limits by
"appropriate policies with respect to new mergers, effective enforcement of
policies to discourage abuse of monopoly power, and the development of
policies to promote change based on real-cost economics. ' 64 Skeoch and
McDonald go on to imply that the greatest problems lie where government
has lent its hand in the creation and protection of monopoly positions.
How is monopoly power to be identified? They assert:
it is the size of the seller relative to the market and to its ability to use power to
restrain, block, obstruct or exclude entry or the offering of alternatives in the
medium-term or in the longer-run, that is important6 5
They point out that such monopoly power may not be associated exclusively
with a single entity, but may occur as the result of concerted action by a large
number of smaller producers. Despite the legislation against resale price
maintenance since 1952, "it would appear safe to conclude that the cost to
consumers [of voluntary resale price maintenance] alone [has] been in the
range of several hundreds of millions of dollars per year."6 6 They point out
that "it is, however, the large firm or group of large firms in a highly con-
centrated market, that is generally considered to exemplify 'monopoly' and
to pose the most serious threat of misuse of monopoly power." 67 Yet, in
identifying monopoly power, they reject the structuralist approach, and in
particular, argue that the empirical (econometric) studies seeking to relate
market structure variables to aspects of performance "have been so incon-
clusive that it would be hazardous to conclude that firms below a given size
(or a given market share) consistently presented no monopoly problems, or
that firms above a given size (or market share) could be reliably presumed
to present such problems." 68 But when they then look at performance criteria
to identify areas of monopoly power they also see significant defects. They
point out that the concept of "fair prices" is usually a cost-plus-profit concept,
and as such is "inconsistent with the role assigned to prices in a dynamic
market economy."'6 9 Excess profits, in the sense of the return to monopoly,
are hard to identify and differentiate from the returns to superior entre-
preneurial performance and the return for risk bearing. More importantly,
low rates of return may be the result of holding "an umbrella over the rest of
the industry and applying a rule of 'live and let live' "70 in order to forestall
entry and the disturbing consequences of "dynamic change." The result of
such constrained behaviour by firms is that "it tends to slow down the rate of
dynamic change and reduces the flexibility and adaptibility of the economy."'
63 Id. at 129.
64 Id. at 132.
66 Id. at 133.
6 Id. at 137.
67 Id.
0s Id. at 138.
69 Id. at 139.
70 Id. at 141.
71 Id. at 143.
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In the short run, firms may dissipate their monopoly profits in the form
of increases in costs. Therefore, Skeoch and McDonald argue that, "[t]he
role of public policy . . . [is] to prevent such firms from entrenching or ex-
ploiting their market power by artificial restraints or abuse of their dominant
positions."72 They see little role for economies of scale in establishing "some
minimum justifiable absolute firm size."73 They reject engineering estimates
as inappropriate when the longer-run perspective is to be applied. Because the
large corporation is a multi-market enterprise, "the search for an optimal scale
of operations for each industry runs the danger of becoming merely a formal,
academic exercise." 74 The approach advocated by the report "would be to
define 'dominant firms' and then to examine how that dominance was main-
tained or extended (and perhaps how it had been achieved)."7
In considering public policy toward the existing centres of monopoly
power, Skeoch and McDonald see no merit in attempting to eliminate the
base(s) of such power. They present their argument in terms of "why not,"
i.e., the difficulties of adopting such a policy: (i) it should be non-dis-
criminatory, but in practice it will be difficult to apply to labour, the pro-
fessions and agriculture; (ii) the policy will be constrained by the existence
of economies of scale at the level of the plant; (iii) breaking up larger,
successful firms may have both "internal" effects and adverse demonstration
effects; (iv) the international aspects are difficult to assess - large firms
appear to be necessary to operate successfully internationally; (v) the pro-
hibition of the abuse of monopoly power will go a long way to eliminate the
undesirable aspects of monopoly power; and (vi) the "structural foundations
of the future" ought not to be shaped by the values of a few government
officials inadequately aware of "unforeseen developments in technology, 9cono-
mic organization and in social institutions. '76 The benefits of undermining the
base(s) of existing positions of monopoly power are not set out.
Their policy proposal in respect of monopoly is that dominant firms be
prohibited from engaging in forms of conduct which are judged to be abuses
of monopoly power. They define a "dominant firm" as
one that is capable within broad limits of choosing its rate of profits (or its share
of the market) undeterred by the consideration that rivals may compete away
these profits by offering better terms to customers.
77
In general terms, "abuse of market power" includes "all forms of competitive
action not based on superior economic performance."78 The following kinds of
behaviour are included in the definition: "preclusive acquisiting [sic] cr
ownership of resources and facilities; deliberated [sic] exclusion; reinforcing a
dominant position by exclusive dealing and tying arrangements or by refusal
to deal; predatory discrimination; a design to forestall competition and to hold




76 Id. at 148-50.
77 Id. at 150.
78 Id. at 151.
(VOL. 15, NO. I
Competition Policy
its monopoly position by other than the achievement of real-cost economies;
the use of reciprocal dealing advantages.... ."79
In their draft statute, the authors put the matter somewhat differently,
defining misuse of dominant position to be
any form of competitive conduct that constitutes, or has the effect of creating or
enhancing, a significant artificial restraint in a market, and which is not justified
or offset by real-cost economies resulting from that conduct.S0
Where misuse of monopoly power was established by the Director of
Investigation and Research before the National Markets Board, the Board
would issue a remedial order. In serious cases, the Board could recommend
changes in tariffs or other measures "to neutralize the firm's dominant
position."8' Only persistent abuse of monopoly power would justify dissolution
or divestiture.
In addition, they recommend that "regulated industries should be deemed
to be generally subject to combines legislation."' 2 They should be exempted
only when the restrictive conduct is specifically imposed by legislation, when
it is actively supervised by regulatory officials, and when the restraint imposed
by legislation is the least restrictive means available to achieve the legislative
objective.83 Skeoch and McDonald would also like to see their approach ap-
plied to agricultural marketing boards, which they view as simply government-
mandated cartels. In the general area of government authorized and super-
vised monopolies beyond the reach of legislation, they recommend that the
Director of Investigation and Research "institute appropriate research studies
to clarify their significance for the government and the public."8'
3. Structural Rationalization, Export Agreements and
Specialization Agreements
Skeoch and McDonald, following the Swedish approach, take structural
rationalization to mean measures designed to increase effective industry per-
formance through changes in the structure of an industry taken either col-
lectively by industry enterprises or, in special circumstances, by public au-
thorities.8 5 Industry structure in this context refers to the number, size, loca-
tion, and range of products of the firms in the trade.
They point out that the Swedish approach specifies three general con-
ditions to be met through the cooperative efforts of the firms: (1) "The unit
to be created by the restriction of competition must remain exposed to effective
competition from without the unit"; (2) given the first condition, it must be
highly probable that the firms party to the agreement will operate more effi-
ciently; and (3) firms must not be forced into nor excluded from the agree-
79 Id.
80 Id. at 156.
81 d. at 151.
82 Id. at 152.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 155.
85 Id. at 170.
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ment.86 While structural rationalization is promoted by the provision of in-
formation concerning supply and demand, cooperation in R & D, cooperation
in technical and other forms of training and by changes in labour agreements
and in legislation, the main measures involve: "mergers and discontinuations,
joint sales organizations and cooperation in production.
87
The authors emphasize that in the Swedish approach rationalization
activities are undertaken by private groups on their own initiative, subject to
the constraints indicated. They note that, in Canada, both big and small
business have "a long tradition of reliance on government for help in solving
[their] problems. '8 8 They argue that if structural rationalization is sponsored
directly by government, and it is unsuccessful, the firms involved "would feel
justified in demanding a measure of state protection, subsidization, or freedom
to engage in restrictive practices."89 There are other difficulties in the Cana-
dian case; obtaining the necessary cooperation of labour and the efforts of
provincial governments to build their own industrial base may frustrae
rationalization.
Public policies aimed at structural rationalization, export and specializa-
tion agreements are based on the idea that positive intervention is required
to speed up the economic transformation processes and so improve the
economy's performance. They assert that demands for rationalization in the
U.K. and Germany occurred in the context of the spread of rigidities, the
erosion of market influences and the intervention of the state in the interest
of "national solidarity."90 As they point out:
The supporters of rationalization had no confidence in the "haphazard and ruth-
less" forces of competition to achieve the reorganization of industry into units
of greater efficiency....o9
However, Skeoch and McDonald conclude that where the transformation
process is too slow or ineffective "it is impossible to restore vigorous market-
oriented performance by tinkering with structural elements in given in-
dustries.
9 2
The factors supporting the case for structural rationalization, the authors
argue, are of two groups: those which originate in the area of international
business, i.e., are universalist in impact, and those which are internal to the
individual country. Such factors as changes in technological and organizational
methods, the increased volatility of demand and the increased minimum
economic size of firms are included in the first category. Internal factors in-
clude preventing the erosion of profitability, increased labour costs, and tech-
nically more complex methods of production.
8 6 Id. at 172.
87 Id. at 173.
88 Id.
8 9 Id. at 174.
9 0 Id. at 161.
9 1 I d. at 163.
92 Id. at 164.
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What are Skeoch and McDonald's policy proposals? First, the initiative
for structural rationalization must come from the private sector. The role of
government should be to ameliorate the impact of the changes on labour and
in allocating the costs of adjustment between the firms and the state. Second,
where the diversity of products is to be reduced, the users will have a voice in
deciding what products are to be eliminated. For practical purposes, this
would apply to industrial or commercial buyers. Third, the three basic con-
ditions specified in the Swedish approach will be necessary for the protection
of the public. They suggest a fourth condition - that export sales agreements
not be associated with international cartels. Fourth, a full record of all
rationalization agreements should be filed with the Director of Investigation and
Research. However, Skeoch and McDonald do not recommend a programme
of advance clearance (although that would be available on request) or com-
pulsory prior examination of rationalization arrangements.93 But, like mergers,
such arrangements could be challenged by the Director before the National
Markets Board. No precise criteria or bases for challenging rationalization
agreements are set out.
4. Industrial and Intellectual Property
In general, the position taken by Skeoch and McDonald toward patents,
trademarks, industrial designs and copyrights is that the enforcers of the
Combines Investigation Act should take as given the property rights conferred
by the various industrial property statutes. "In principle, industrial property
rights should not be treated differently from any other assets so far as com-
petition policy is concerned. ' 94 They observe that it is only "fortuitous" that
an industrial property right, in specific cases, "defines a meaningful degree of
monopoly power for purposes of market analysis. '95 The authors refuse to get
drawn into a discussion of the reform of the law as it relates to industrial
property. However, if the application of property rights in patents, trademarks
and copyrights goes beyond what is contemplated or provided for in the
statutes (e.g. special exclusionary or anticompetitive effects), they argue that
remedies should be available under the Combines Investigation Act. They
draw a "fundamental distinction between the exercise of a right conferred
expressly or by necessary implication under an industrial property statute and
a claim deriving only from a contract that involves such a right."96 They give
the example of a tie-in arrangement with a licencee in which the sale of an un-
patented product is tied to the sale of the patented product. These tying
arrangements and also those involving exclusive dealing, should be subject to
the Combines Investigation Act. They propose similar treatment of licences
of industrial property which are aimed at price discrimination. On the other
hand, where the industrial property statutes provide for licences extending
territorial or field of use restrictions, these should be exempted from the re-
fusal to deal and market restriction sections of the Combines Investigation Act.
93 Id. at 175.
94 ld. at 181.
95 ld. at 179.
DO Id. at 184.
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Licensing or the assignment of industrial property rights should remain
subject to the conspiracy provision of the Combines Investigation Act.
"Licence requirements persisting by contract after the expiry of the statutory
right, inclusion of 'no contest' clauses in licences or unjustified threats of
infringement actions are examples of conduct that could, on the facts, con-
stitute misuse [of monopoly power] within the meaning of the Combines In-
vestigation Act.' 97
Skeoch and McDonald assert that failure to work a patent or refusal to
licence where the owner does not work the patent significantly, where the firm
holds a dominant position, may require a compulsory licensing order by the
National Markets Board. However, they recommend that the power to order
a licence "constitutes a form of divestiture" and should be employed by the
Board "only on a last resort basis" as it would in the case of other abuses of
monopoly power. They propose, in light of these recommendations, that
section 29 of the Combines Investigation Act be repealed. Finally, they
recommend that no special remedial powers be provided in the case of "know-
how" agreements, these being adequately protected by the common law of
contracts.
5. Corporate Interlocks
The report argues that the only overlap between boards of directors
relevant to competition policy is that in which the interlocked enterprises are
actual or potential competitors or have another market connection, e.g., a
buyer-seller relationship. "Concentration of general economic power by means
of interlocks is . . . not of direct concern to competition policy; it is an es-
sentially different matter."98 The formulation of public policy toward inter-
locks, they assert, should be guided by the following considerations: (i)
"There is no reliable evidence that interlocks have in fact harmed competitive
processes in Canada in any generally significant way";90 (ii) generalizations
about interlocks are difficult, because circumstances vary between industries;
(iii) "the principle of minimum government interference requires that no
restraint be imposed that is not clearly required, and that no more be pro-
hibited than is clearly undesirable"; 00 and (iv) "managerial skill and enter-
preneurial talent are so scarce and so important to economic health that any
unnecessary restriction or inhibition against selecting the best people for each
particular industry could be counterproductive."''1 1 No positive arguments are
presented supporting legislation which would constrain corporate interlocks.
In general, Skeoch and McDonald see the existing common law and statutory
provisions relating to the duties of directors as adequate to deal with conflicts
of interest. They list seven specific difficulties in formulating effective legisla-
tion dealing directly with interlocks.' 02 The report points out that "the under-
9 7 id. at 186.
98 id. at 190.
99 Id. at 191.
'
0 0 Id. at 192.
10l Id.
10 2 Id. at 195-96.
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lying concern is substantive and yet the rules would look only to a particular
formal mechanism" and concludes that a general statutory prohibition of
specific types of interlocks is not justified in Canada. However, it proposes
that the National Markets Board should have the power "to prohibit a par-
ticular interlock or defined types of interlocks between specific enterprises, in
a situation where an undesirable practice or effect has been found to exist that
was or was probably [or is likely to be] caused or facilitated by the inter-
lock."'1 3 The authors see such prohibitions as probably within the scope of
sections 30(1) and 30(2) of the existing Combines Investigation Act.
6. Price Discrimination
In general, Skeoch and McDonald wish to direct public policy toward a
position in which real economic advantages in purchasing and distribution
can be fully utilized. They recognize that price discrimination has both desir-
able and undesirable economic effects; it is both pro- and anti-competitive
depending on the circumstances. They argue that the origin of the existing
legislation was in the Depression and in periods of severe structural change.
The time has come to make policy in light of more normal conditions. After
a careful canvass of the important issues, the authors conclude there is no real
case for protecting small business with legislation relating to price discrimina-
tion which has the effect of limiting the full exploitation of real economies. In
any event, small business is not demonstrably pro-competition. In summary,
they reject the idea that public policy should be aimed at "structural balance."
They recognize that if large scale purchasing power cannot be fully utilized
directly it may well be used in less desirable ways.
Skeoch and McDonald propose to delete section 34 as a criminal offence
from the Combines Investigation Act and to write in a new "general section
permitting the National Markets Board to prohibit discriminatory pricing
behaviour by either buyers or sellers."' 0 4 The essence of the offence will be
sales "at less than the reasonably anticipated long-run average cost of pro-
duction and distribution," where such sales have "the effect of adversely
affecting competition."1 05 They are sharply critical of historical accounting
costs as useful measures of the economic concepts they wish to see imple-
mented by the National Markets Board. They seem quite sanguine about the
ability of the Board to develop a consistent approach and appraise the cost
calculations of those called before it.
Predatory conduct based on high levels of market power is to be included
within the concept of "abuse of monopoly power" discussed above. Presum-
ably, this proposal is designed to replace the existing section 34(1) (c).
Several "supplementary considerations" to the-general price discrimina-
tion provisions are set out:
1) a good faith defence of meeting competition even when the price of a com-
petitor is itself discriminatory' 0 6
103 Id. at 196-97.
104 Id. at 217; emphasis added.
105 Id. at 217-18.
106 Id. at 222.
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2) retention of the equal treatment of goods and services of "like quality and
quantity"'
0 7
3) while not retaining the concept of requiring "a practice" or "policy" of dis-
criminating before tackling the problem, the Board should consider a case "as
long as it is of significant proportions whether or not it amounts to a
practice." 0 8
The report recommends that section 35, dealing with discrimination in ad-
vertising and promotional allowances, be "retained in its present form but
recast to place it within the jurisdiction of the Board."'109
The only dissenting view in the entire report is expressed by Reuben M.
Bromstein on the proposals with respect to price discrimination. He wants to
retain sections 34 and 35 as criminal provisions and to have the National Mar-
kets Board's jurisdiction over the proposed civil remedies be supplementary to
the existing legislation. He argues that while "there is no record of judicial en-
forcement," these sections act as "a demonstrative deterrent.",n Mr. Brom-
stein expresses his concern for the position of small business in the economy.
Skeoch's reply all but dismisses Bromstein's concern and he marshals some
empirical data to support the proposition that small business' share of retail
sales is virtually unchanged since the 1930's.
7. Basing-Point Pricing
The authors point out that basing-point pricing is one case of a general
set of delivered pricing schemes. They recognize that it may be an essential
element in collusive price setting through cooperative formula pricing. They
point out its presence in the R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Co. Ltd."'
and R. v. Armco Canada Ltd.1"2 cases. However, the report urges "due
caution" regarding changes in public policy to promote or modify the use of
delivered pricing systems.
Skeoch and McDonald argue that strict f.o.b. mill pricing could result
in a series of local/regional monopolies with varying degrees of price dis-
crimination as freight absorption is used to enlarge individual firms' markets.
In particular, they are concerned about its impact on the realization of real
economies of scale. They emphasize that they "do not lay great stress on the
price discrimination element in the public policy appraisal of the basing-point
system."'113 In general, "the test should be whether the substitution of some
107 Id.
108 Id. at 223.
109 Id. at 224.
110 Id. at 353.
"'l Supra, note 41.
112 R. v. Armco Drainage and Metal Products of Canada Ltd., (Unreported)
Supreme Court of Ontario, Toronto, November 13, 1959, Bureau of Competition Policy
mimeo 54-1. More recently a number of these firms were convicted of price-fixing in a
scheme incorporating zonal delivered pricing. See, R. v. Armco Canada Ltd. (1975),
6 O.R. (2d) 521; 21 C.C.C. (2d) 129; 17 C.P.R. (2d) 211; sentencing, Re R. and Armco
Canada Ltd. (1976), 8 O.R. (2d) 573; 24 C.C.C. (2d) 147; 19 C.P.R. (2d) 273; 24
C.P.R. (2d) 145 varying (sub. nom. R. v. Arnco Canada Ltd.).
113 Supra, note 1 at 240.
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system of freight absorption for a basing-point system will reduce costs (the
net result of production and transportation cost changes) and increase
ouput.
' u14
Where a basing-point scheme has been used to facilitate price fixing, the
report recommends that, in addition to the fine, the firms be ordered to give
buyers the f.o.b. mill option. In summary, the report does not propose any
new legislation in respect of basing-point pricing.
8. Loss-Leader Selling
The report begins by pointing out that agitation for legislation in respect
of loss-leader selling has occurred in waves and is associated with the intro-
duction of new methods of distribution, recession, excess entry and occasion-
ally with trials of strength among major retailers. The authors indicate that
what is meant by a loss-leader ranges from sales below regular price to selling
at prices below the firm's net acquisition cost. They argue that "the low-cost
seller should not be prevented from using his advantage to increase his turn-
over by quoting lower prices and thus lowering his cost still further." 15 They
obviously believe there are unexploited economies of scale in many areas of
retailing.
Skeoch and McDonald would reject any public policy which would re-
quire a uniform markup type of pricing.",, Consistently with their general
approach to facilitating change in the economy, they conclude that, "[i]t is
obvious that price structures should be sufficiently flexible over time to reflect
and encourage changes in technology which may reduce costs and prices.
These cost and price reductions are the very essence of progress in the in-
dustry.""
7
Three possible policy alternatives are outlined:
1) the prohibition of sales at prices less than net acquisition cost-' 8
2) the prohibition of sales below acquisition cost plus a specified minimum
markupS1 9 and,
3) the prohibition of "cut-throat" competition12 0
All are rejected.
The authors view loss-leader selling as part of the long-run dynamic
process of technological and organizational changes, and propose no new legis-
lation dealing with loss-leader selling. But the implications of their analysis
are difficult to determine. Currently, loss-leader selling is included in the
Combines Investigation Act under section 38(9) (a) and (b) where it is a de-
fence to a charge of refusal to supply. Under section 38(9) (a), where a sup-
114 Id. at 240-41.
115 Id. at 246.
116 Id. at 247.
117 Id. at 251.
118 Id. at 256.
119 Id. at 256-57.
120 Id. at 258.
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plier believes that a seller "was making a practice of using [the supplier's] pro-
ducts ... as loss-leaders, that is to say, not for the purpose of making a profit
thereon but for purposes of advertising," he may successfully defend a charge of
refusal to supply. Apparently this loss-leader defence is to remain as the
report did not indicate that it should be removed. One might argue that loss-
leader selling could be attacked under the present section 34(1) (c) which
prohibits a seller from engaging "in a policy of selling products at prices
unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening
competition or eliminating a competitor, or designed to have such effect."
However, the authors propose to delete the present section 34, as they wish to
bring the price discrimination sub-sections 34(1) (a) and (b) under the
National Markets Board civil procedures. Section 34(1) (c) apparently is to
be subsumed by predatory conduct, but which would only be prohibited by
the Board if it amounted to "misuse of dominant position."
9. Cost Justification and Economic Policy
This section should be viewed as part of the theoretical rationale under-
lying Skeoch and McDonald's analysis of price discrimination, basing-point
pricing and loss-leader selling. It is a lecture on the folly of the general ap-
proach of "cost plus a reasonable profit" or "public utility pricing" as applied
to what we usually refer to as the unregulated sectors of the economy. The
authors point out that the approach of regulating monopoly was aimed at
protecting the level and stability of certain people's incomes and that such a
policy is backward looking and creates barriers to economic change. Like such
predecessors as Professors Adams and Gray,' 2 ' they recognize the importance
of the fine hand of the government in creating and maintaining private mo-
nopoly power.
Their analysis of the vagaries of cost accounting should be required
reading for all economists, especially those who use such data uncritically.
As a general public policy, Skeoch and McDonald want the government
to eliminate the use of cost-justification criteria in evaluating economic per-
formance for they are "contributing to the steady erosion of the market-
oriented sector.' 22 With respect to predatory pricing they reject the Turner-
Areeda proposal that firms be prohibited from selling at "a price below
reasonably anticipated average variable cost."'' They prefer long run margin-
al or average cost "because of its fundamental anticipatory bias."'2 4
10. Administration and Adjudication
The implementation of their proposals, the authors maintain, requires
the resolution of three basic issues: the specificity of standards and criteria
121 Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray, Monopoly in America, the Government as
Promoter (New York: Macmillan, 1955).
122 Supra, note 1 at 272.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 273.
[voL. 15, No. I
Competition Policy
set out in the statute; the types of evidence and judgments required to apply
the standards; and the character of the decision-making body.
In the Introduction to their report, Skeoch and McDonald conclude that
the total reliance upon criminal law and criminal remedies "has been in-
creasingly and widely recognized as a serious obstacle to effective implementa-
tion of competition policy."' 25 The use of the criminal law, they argue, de-
pends "upon a substantive prohibition that is defined sufficiently precisely in
advance that a person has fair notice, before engaging in the conduct, that it is
against the law and the public interest for him to do so."' 26 Since the pro-
visions of competition policy "cannot realistically define many undesirable
events except in terms of their economic effect or likely economic effect' ' 27
exclusive reliance on the criminal law approach is inappropriate.
The heart of the report's administration and adjudication recommenda-
tions is the creation of a specialized adjudicating body, the National Markets
Board, which will make decisions and establish remedies in the context of
civil procedures. Critics will undoubtedly recall the Competitive Practices
Tribunal proposed in the ill-fated Bill C-256 (the Competition Act) in June
of 1971.128 The policy which the authors "believe will maximize the long-run
flexibility and effectiveness of the Canadian economy ... depends critically
upon the existence of a decision-making authority capable of dealing percep-
tively and impartially on a case-by-case basis with the complex issues of fact
and remedy that will frequently require analysis and prescription."'2 9 They
argue that the "courts should continue to play a vital role," but "the case for
placing these additional powers [adjudicative powers respecting mergers, mis-
uses of market power, price discrimination and rationalization, specialization
and export agreements] in the hands of a specialized adjudicator is very
strong."'130
They stress the necessity to strike a careful balance between specificity
and general applicability of statutory provisions. In the Canadian context, they
assert, it is not appropriate to have many "mechanical" per se rules. While
such rules may provide predictability they will probably not result in "eco-
nomically realistic decisions.' x31 They clearly opt for the "case-by-case" ap-
proach, asserting: "Predictability is not the paramount, let alone the sole,
concern of the law."''i
By proposing to set out a clear statement of the objectives, (in sharp
contrast to the existing policy), which will become the fundamental guidelines
126 Id. at 39.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 39-40.
128 B. C. McDonald's views of the Competition Act's use of a Tribunal are con-
tained in his paper, "The Central Legal Issues Raised by the Government Proposals" in
L. A. Skeoch, ed., Canadian Competition Policy, supra, note 21 at 10-17.
29 Supra, note 1 at 279.
130 Id. at 280.
131 Id. at 284.
l82 Id. at 281.
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for the National Markets Board, the authors of the report hope to resolve the
issue of who is to make policy: the elected representatives or the judges. In
adopting a case-by-case approach, which they anticipate will be responsive to
a changing environment, Skeoch and McDonald recognize that "the use of
precedent becomes somewhat more sophisticated than in the usual court pro-
ceedings.'
Before discussing the details of the report's proposals regarding enforce-
ment procedures and the National Markets Board it may be useful to see how
the total system would look if their proposals were adopted. A schematic
representation is given in Figure 1.
(a) The National Markets Board (NMB)
(i) Composition
The NMB is to be a superior court of record with a Chairman who is to
be an experienced superior court judge. It will consist of a minimum of four
full-time members appointed for a term of less than ten years, and minimum
of four part-time members appointed for a term of less than three years. The
authors lay particular stress on the qualifications of the lay members of the
NMB: the majority of both the full-time and part-time members "should have
had extensive private sector experience (as distinguished from, though perhaps
in addition to, civil service or university experience)."14 They stress that they
"place more faith in experience and informed common sense than in cloistered
'expertise'."' 8 5 Finally, they warn: "If, however, the government in making
the appointments were to be influenced by any grounds other than personal
qualifications for the job, the results could be considerably more damaging
than leaving the law as it is."' 36
It is anticipated that the NMB will work in panels of three or more
(with a minimum of one full-time member). The authors believe that this
should prevent both large backlogs of cases and with the turnover in mem-
bership "prevent balkanization of any ingrained convictions or aberrational
views."' 87
(ii) Functions and Powers
The NMB, it is proposed, will have substantive civil jurisdiction with
respect to mergers, misuses of monopoly power, price discrimination, rational-
ization, specialization and export agreements along with the list of "reviewable
matters" (see Figure 1) which were assigned to the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Commission by the 1975 amendments to the Combines Investigation Act.
The RTPC is to be abolished. The NMB will not be a U.S. type regulatory
agency, e.g., the Federal Trade Commission. It will not perform any research
133 Id. at 285.
134 Id. at 294.
-185 Id. at 295.
186 Id.
137 ld. at 297.
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activity, it will not have any general rule-making authority and it will not have
any power to initiate investigations which could eventually come before it for
adjudication.
The Board will have the power to issue orders of prohibition which are
both injunctive and remedial. Skeoch and McDonald propose that the NMB
be given the new powers given to the RTPC in the 1975 amendments. They
stress that "the Board ought not [to] make any order that does not tell the
businessman with reasonable certainty just what is and what is not covered
by the order,"'u1 because both private civil and criminal actions can ensue
from violations of an order by the Board. At the same time, they also propose
that the Board "confine itself to saying 'no' to business proposals or activities,
and avoid giving detailed direction as to how the persons before it ought to
conduct their business affairs in the future."''5 9 The report proposes that the
NMB be given the power to order the dissolution of a merger and the power
to order divestiture of assets only as an "extreme remedy" on a "last resort
basis" for the repetitive misuse of market power. In the case of the latter,
such an order would be subject to review by the Federal Court of Canada.14 0
The Board would be given the power to issue interim prohibition orders
but these would be subject to review by the courts within 90 days. The NMB
would not be given the power to order continual returns of information.
(iii) Procedures
The NMB would have all the powers, rights and privileges of a superior
court of record and, as such, would be subject to the rules of natural justice.
It would have the power to establish its own rules of practice and be able to
implement its own pre-hearing procedures. However, the report recommends
that sole hearing officers, whether or not they are members of the Board, not
be used. With three exceptions, all actions brought before the Board would
be initiated by the Director of Investigation and Research (see Figure 1).
The exceptions are (1) application by a person subject to an order to rescind
or vary an order, (2) application by a person seriously injured by a practice
over which the NMB has jurisdiction where the matter is too urgent to pro-
ceed via the Director's office, and (3) applications for approval of rationali-
zation, specialization or export agreements.
Interested parties would be entitled to intervene in proceedings before
the Board. However, parties to the proceedings would become liable to pay
costs ordered by the Board. Conversely, the Board could order costs paid to
such parties. Hearings by the Board should be in public, "except to the extent
it deems it necessary to protect a legitimate business interest.... "14
Skeoch and McDonald recommend that the "basic burden of persuasion
should be placed on the person who seeks the order."14 But, "[i]nsofar as
188 Id. at 301.
189 Id. at 300.
140 Id. at 302.
141 Id. at 307.
142 Id.
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relevant matters are peculiarly within the knowledge and capacity of private
parties to demonstrate,... it is reasonable to rely on those parties to furnish
the evidence.' 43 As to the quantum of proof, the authors propose that it be
"the normal civil standard which it usually described as the 'balance of
probabilities'."' The Board's decisions should be accompanied by written
reasons which should be made public.
(iv) Finality of Decisions
The authors argue it is "undesirable to give any body or court the power
to interfere with the content of the factual or remedial decisions" made by the
NMB.' 4 However, the NMB would come under the supervision of the Federal
Court of Canada, and appeals from the Board's decisions could be made upon
three grounds as provided in Section 28 of the Federal Court Act:146 failure
to observe a principle of natural justice; an error in law; and an erroneous
finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner. Therefore, the "courts
will have the ultimate power to decide as a matter of law what the critical
words in the statute mean" and to resolve disputes as to the extent of the
powers and authority of the NMB.147 They stress that it would "risk defeating
the entire purpose of the specialized Board to permit the courts to substitute
their views as to proper judgments concerning facts, market definition, or the
design of the remedy."
u48
Skeoch and McDonald argue there is need for a "safety valve" and also
for a means to effect "an over-riding coordination of national policies."' 49
Hence, they propose to allow appeals to the Cabinet within sixty days on any
order of the Board. They also propose that the Cabinet "be required to make
its decision and reasons public at the time of any decision to interfere with a
Board order."'15 It is at this level that the "raw political questions" will be
resolved."61
(b) Enforcement
(i) By the Director
The authors charge the Director of Investigation and Research with the
responsibility for coordinating and making consistent both the criminal and
civil provisions which would result from the 1975 amendments and their
proposals. They specifically reject the idea that the Director be able to
prosecute criminal cases either independently of the Department of Justice or
after that Department has expressed an unwillingness to proceed to court. Yet
they "see no legal reason" why the Director, "if he felt frustrated by delay or
143Id. at 308.
1441d.
145 Id. at 309.
146 R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.).
3
47 Supra, note 1 at 310.
148Id.
149 Id. at 314.
150 Id. at 315.
151 Id. at 314.
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an unwise decision" of the Attorney-General of Canada, could not send a
copy of his Statement of Evidence to a provincial attorney general.1 52 But
the authors do reject the idea that if the Department of Justice refuses to
proceed, that the Statement of Evidence be made public where it might be of
assistance in private civil actions.
When the Director uses his compulsory investigative powers and intends
to go before the NMB, the report recommends that there be, in advance of the
hearing, and in addition to any pre-hearing discovery, "comprehensive dis-
closure" of the proposed evidence, a narrative of the relevant facts, at least
outlines of testimony to be given by witnesses, (expert or otherwise), copies
of documents to be introduced and "a statement of positions to be taken on
matters such as market definition, the nature of public harm involved and, on
a tentative basis, remedies."'1 At the pre-hearing discovery the defendant
would also be expected to make a fairly extensive disclosure of his position.
(ii) By Private Persons
The authors take the position that "[pirivate actions are an integral part
of the total law enforcement apparatus .... 14 They see the Act as both a
sword and a shield. As a sword, private civil actions are designed to effect
compensation of those disadvantaged by restraints of trade and to prevent un-
just enrichment of those who perpetrate illegal restraints.
In considering any additional proposals for multiple damages, class
actions and litigation assistance for private plaintiffs, Skeoch and McDonald
urge "that policy decisions in this area... must be made in the light of com-
prehensive and long-run criteria, and that short-run immediate interests
should not blind policy-makers to the ultimate objective of making markets
work more effectively."' 55
With respect to the use of the Act as a shield, Skeoch and McDonald
propose that section 39 be amended to clarify its existing wording that nothing
in the Act should be construed to deprive any person of any civil cause of
action and also to "provide that no action shall be based on a contractual
provision or brought in furtherance of a plan or scheme that contravenes a
requirement of Part V of the Act or an order of the Board."''50 The purpose
of the latter provisions is to ensure that a defence of illegality or public policy
is available.
They recommend that the NMB not be given jurisdiction on applications
by the Director to declare private covenants in restraint of trade to be un-
enforceable. Similarly, the NMB is not to be given any authority with respect
to unjustified threats of patent infringement. Both of these matters are to be
left to the courts.
(c) Advance Clearance
The authors view the current programme of compliance (i.e., the Director's
152 1d. at 319.
153 Id. at 322.
15 Id. at 323.
155 Id. at 327.
156 Id. at 328.
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"open door policy") as a "necessary evil rather than a virtue."'157 They wish
to avoid the process of the Director appearing to "negotiate" with businessmen
over restrictive trade practices. It is argued that "it would not be desirable
to formalize the program of compliance by giving the Director powers to grant
legally effective clearance."'68 It appears that Skeoch and McDonald envisage
the "withering away" of compliance activities. They propose, however, to
permit the Director to issue advance clearances for proposed mergers and for
rationalization agreements. "Clearance of a merger would insulate the firms
involved from any further proceedings before the Board challenging the
merger. In the case of a rationalization agreement, clearance would be avail-
able to clarify the status of the agreement."' 169 These exceptions are made to
the general approach, because they involve "non-recurring transactions"
which involve "substantial reorganization of assets, contractual relations, and
methods . ".."160
Following a written application, the Director has thirty days to undertake
an informal investigation and decide whether to launch a formal inquiry. The
proposal will be deemed to be approved at the expiry of the thirty day period
unless the Director indicates to the applicant he wishes to hold a formal
inquiry. He then has an additional sixty days to investigate and decide upon the
advance clearance. If the Director proposes to challenge the merger or ration-
alization agreement he must do so before the end of the sixty day period or the
application is deemed to be approved. Clearance is a binding safeguard "only
if there were no significant omissions from the original application."' 61 With
respect to mergers that come within the purview of the Foreign Investment
Review Agency, the report recommends that "the matter not proceed to
cabinet until the evaluation under the Combines Investigation Act [advance
clearance provisions] is completed."'' 62
(d) The Research Function
The research function is to be lodged entirely within the Bureau of Com-
petition Policy. The NMB, unlike the RTPC, will have no role to play in
generating research. Studies done by the Bureau should be published directly
by the Bureau without any outside approval. The authors point out that the
"very ambitious program of research" envisaged by the MacQuarrie Com-
mittee in its Report',3 in 1952 has not come about. In what must be a severe
understatement they observe, "something more might have been expected
than has been achieved."''
The authors of the report have great doubts about the ability of organized
groups, particularly those in government, to produce creative research. It is
their view that "[o]nly research of superior quality is worth doing at 0;...
157 Id. at 326.
Uis Id. at 335.
159 Id. at 334.
160 Id. at 337.
161 Id. at 338.
1
62 Id. at 341.
16 Report of the Committee to Study Combines Legislation and the Interim Report
on Resale Price Maintenance (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952).
0 4 Supra, note I at 344.
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A small staff marked by intellectual excellence and ability to produce respected
studies should be the aim rather than a larger group with general 'service'
responsibilities in the Bureau."'165 They suggest there should be two separate
units: an economic analysis section to support the Bureau's enforcement
efforts, and "[a] small research group which would undertake independent
studies, as well as joint studies" with top people in academia, business and
other government departments. 160 The research programme and output should
be subject to external review. They also recognize the benefits of the Bureau
engaging in legal research for competition policy as the nexus of the disciplines
of both economics and law. With respect to research studies by the Bureau,
Skeoch and McDonald propose that they be available for sixty days during
which interested parties could submit comments to the Director. "The Director
would then prepare a brief summary of such comments for inclusion as an
appendix to the research study.' u67 They see little need for the Director to use
his formal powers of search or examination of witnesses under oath to prepare
research studies.
D. APPRAISAL AND CRITIQUE
1. The Choice of Objectives
Skeoch and McDonald indicate that the objectives of competition policy
ought to be directed toward facilitating long-run dynamic change, the adoption
of real-cost economies and the discouragement of artificial restraints based
on market power rather than superior economic performance. But the most
important objective is taken to be the encouragement of dynamic change. In
1969, the Economic Council of Canada stated that the objective of com-
petition policy legislation "should be the promotion of dynamic efficiency,
flexibility and good all-around performance in the Canadian economy."' 08 A
few pages later in their discussion the Council refined their position:
Essentially, we are advocating the adoption of a single objective for competition
policy: the improvement of economic efficiency and the avoidance of economic
waste .... 169
In adopting this position, the Council pointed out that it did not wish to dispar-
age other objectives such as a more equitable distribution of income or the diffu-
sion of economic power. Rather it felt that a competition policy concentrated
on a single objective "is likely to be applied more consistently and effectively,"
and that the tax-transfer system was better equipped to deal with these other
objectives.' 70 The Council also pointed out that the pursuit of multiple goals
(e.g., efficiency and the diffusion of power) may result in a conflict of objec-
tives, and that the pursuit of efficiency and the reduction of economic waste
could also result in furthering other objectives. It is interesting that in the
Preamble to Bill C-256, the proposed Competition Act, competition is seen
to be "the best means of allocating resources [and] of enhancing efficiency in
'6
5 Id. at 346.
166 Id.
167d. at 350.
168 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy, supra,
note 4 at 5.
169 Id. at 19.
170 Id. at 20.
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the production and distribution of goods and services . .. " and of furthering
"individual enterprise by decentralizing economic power ... .,171 This point
is reiterated in the "Explanatory Notes" that accompany Bill C-256.
In economic terms, competition policy is designed to ensure that Canada makes
the most efficient use possible of its resources.... But the considerations of com-
petition policy go well beyond economics alone. Concentrations of power, which
can serve to restrict opportunity and individual freedom, are not acceptable in
today's social and political environment and a major objective of competition
policy must be to ensure that such concentrations of power are not allowed to
develop.17
2
The report may be criticized for its failure to even consider alternative
objectives toward which competition policy might be directed. Even in the
context of the small (by the standards of the U.S. and a number of Western
European countries) Canadian economy where the conflict between the
number of competitors and efficiency (economies of scale) is most poignant,
it is not unreasonable to weigh the larger social implications of opting in one
direction or the other. As noted above in the discussion of interlocking
directorates, Skeoch and McDonald assert that the concentration of general
economic power is not one of direct concern to competition policy. An
examination of the trade-off, in terms of all social costs, between numbers
and efficiency is particularly relevant if one is skeptical that, consumers, for
whose benefit Adam Smith told us the economy ought to be run,173 will in
fact receive the benefits of dynamic change and real-cost economies. This
point is specifically addressed in the Preamble to Bill C-256:
it is also recognized that in cases where a market is too small to support a suffi-
cient number of independent firms of efficient size to promote effective com-
petition, alternative means of promoting maximum efficiency may be required but
that where such an alternative means is adopted, it is necessary to ensure that the
resultant benefits will be transmitted in substantial part and within a reasonable
time to the public... 174
Repeatedly in their report, Skeoch and McDonald emphasize the necessity
to take a long-term view of economic processes and repeatedly we are asked
to opt for policies the benefit of which will only be realized in the long run.
Such proposals are rational only if the social rate of time preference is low or,
alternatively, if the future payoffs from "dynamic change" are so enormous
that their present value offsets the short run costs that may be imposed on
consumers as we allow firms to work out their destiny.
But let us look at "dynamic change" in its own terms. The report fails to
171 Bill C-256, The Competition Act, first reading, June 29, 1971.
172 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, The Competition Act: Ex-
planatory Notes, supra, note 5 at 8-9.
173 In 1776 Adam Smith argued:
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the
producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting
that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be
absurd to attempt to prove it.
Of course, the formal proof of this proposition was not given for over 150 years. Smith
was quick to point out that "in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is
almost sacrificed to that of the producer: and it seems to consider production, and not
consumption as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce ... " (The
Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter VII).
I74 Supra, note 171.
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emphasize that dynamic change is not the end of competition policy, but rather
the means by which the rate of economic growth, as measured by real income per
capita, is to be increased.175 Their approach is almost visionary. As the authors
see it, through the workings of the international technocracy embodied in pri-
vate business firms, the optimal rate of technological change and innovation in
economic organization will occur so long as governments seek only to strike
down "artificial" restraints that may be imposed by the odd unenlightened
competitor. Since they take existing.market structures as given, they would
appear to imply that such structures are the ones best suited to facilitate the
process of change. There is absolutely no discussion of the determinants of
technological change, except to note that government efforts have been largely
unsuccessful, and in particular on the relationship between industry structure
and economically significant innovation.
Given that we already have a highly concentrated economy176 whose
apparent rate of technological innovation is low,1'7 7 it is hard to see how the
acceptance of the structural status quo, coupled with some new prohibitions
on business conduct will unleash the horses of "dynamic change." In a report
on the forces of economic change, it is interesting that the authors did not
once refer to a single work on technological change and innovation. Although
it would be entirely consistent with their stance, Skeoch and McDonald have
not specifically embraced Schumpeter's position that market power is neces-
sary for innovation and that innovation is the core of effective competition.
1" 8
They give no indication as to what configuration of market structure best
facilitates dynamic change.'7 9 But this is symptomatic of the antistructuralist
position taken in the entire report.
175A. Milton Moore, How Much Price Competition? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1970) at 127, makes the point with admirable directness: "The general
objective of a national competition policy is, of course, to increase income per capita
by increasing productivity. The role of a competition policy is to force change and
efficiency upon industries."
1
7 6 Industrial Organization and Concentration in the Manufacturing, Mining, and
Logging Industries (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1976) (Cat. No. 31-514).
.77 The Senate Special Committee on Science Policy has stated:
The available evidence on Canadian R&D output, although incomplete, is sufficient
to justify the conclusion that Canada's innovative performance is low compared
with that of most other industrially advanced countries.
in I A Science Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) at 138. Two ad-
ditional volumes were published by the Committee in 1972 and 1973. More generally
see, Pierre L. Bourgault, Innovation and the Structure of Canadian Industry, Science
Council of Canda Special Study, No. 23 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972); Science
Council of Canada, Innovation in a Cold Climate: The Dilemma of Canadian Manu-
facturing (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971); Andrew H. Wilson, Governments and
Innovation, Special Study, No. 26, Science Council of Canada (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1973); and Arthur J. Cordell, The Multinational Firm, Foreign Direct Invest-
Ment, and Canadian Science Policy, Special Study No. 22, Science Council of Canada
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).
178 See, E. S. Mason, Schumpeter on Monopoly and the Large Firm (1951), 33
Review of Economics and Statistics 139.
179 Debate abounds on this issue. For a useful short summary of the literature see,
Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey
(1975), 13 Journal of Economic Literature 1.
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2. The Significance of Market Structure in Determining Conduct and
Performance
The authors see little value in either the theoretical or empirical work
which seeks to relate the characteristics of market structure to aspects of
business behaviour and economic performance in terms of public policy. For
example, they state that "the industrial concentration hypothesis in any of its
variants is currently the subject of so much fundamental controversy that it
provides a very unstable basis for any important public policy initiatives."''8 0
This generalization is not supported by a single reference. Similarly, their sum-
mation of the econometric investigations is neither supported by any dis-
cussion in the text of the report or by any reference to empirical work which
would either support or deny their conclusion. Their position is put as follows:
Generalizations from empirical cross-sectional investigations of size and innovation
performance, size and barriers to entry, size and scale economies, have so far
related to larger economies and the results even there have been so inconclusivo
that it would be hazardous to conclude that firms below a given size (or a given
market share) consistently presented no monopoly problems, or that firms above
a given size (or market share) could be reliably presumed to present such
problems.' 81
Perhaps they did not have the opportunity to read Leonard Weiss' com-
prehensive discussion, "The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Anti-
trust"1'2 or to review the work on the Canadian economy by McFetridge,
Jones et al., Orr, de Silva, Bloch, Dooley and others.1 1 Weiss' conclusion,
following his review of forty-six empirical studies must serve to severely
challenge Skeoch and McDonald's view:
To summarize, the theory of the dominant firm unequivocably points to high prices
180 Supra, note 1 at 215.
181 Id. at 138.
182 This paper is found in Goldschmid et. al., eds., supra, note 179 at 184-232.
18 3 D. G. McFetridge, Market Structure and Price-Cost Margins: An Analysis of the
Canadian Manufacturing Sector, [1973] Canadian Journal of Economics 344; J. C. H.
Jones, L. Laudadio, M. Percy, Market Structure and Profitability in Canadian Manu-
facturing Industry: Some Cross-Section Results, [1973] Canadian Journal of Economics
356; Robert R. Kerton, Price Effects of Market Power in the Canadian Newspaper In-
dustry, [1973] Canadian Journal of Economics 602; Dale Orr, The Economic Determi-
nants of Entry into Canadian Banking: 1963-7, [1974] Canadian Journal of Economics
82; Dale Orr, The Determinants of Entry: A Study of the Canadian Manufacturing In-
dustries (1974), 56 Review of Economics and Statistics 58; G. F. Mathewson, A Note
on the Price Effects of Market Power in the Canadian Newspaper Industry, [1972]
Canadian Journal of Economics 298; K. E. A. de Silva, Industrial Concentration and
Price Changes in Canadian Manufacturing Industries, 1961-67, [1971] Quarterly Review
of Economics and Business 80; Harry Bloch, Prices, Costs and Profits in Canadian
Manufacturing: The Influence of Tariffs and Concentration, [1974] Canadian Journal of
Economics 594; Peter C. Dooley, Retail Oligopoly: An Empirical Study of the Structure,
Conduct and Performance of the Grocery Trade on the Prairies, Study No. 3 for the
Royal Commission on Consumer Problems and Inflation (Regina: 1969); K. Dennis,
"Market Power and the Behaviour of Industrial Prices' in Prices and Incomes Com-
mission, Essays on Price Changes in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973); D.
G. McFetridge, "Market Structure and Price Behaviour: Empirical Studies on the
Canadian Manufacturing Sector," Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto,
1972; D. G. McFetridge, The Determinants of Price Behaviour: A Study of the Canadian
Cotton Textile Industry (1973), 22 Journal of Industrial Economics 141.
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and suggests high profit rates for dominant firms. Our assorted oligopoly theories
are more equivocal in their details, but all of them that have not been discredited
point to higher margins in concentrated industries once more. Our massive effort
to test these predictions has, by and large, supported them for "normal" years
such as the period 1953-1967, though the concentration-profits relationship is
weakened or may even disappear completely in periods of accelerating inflation
or directly following such periods. By and large the relationship holds up for
Britain, Canada, and Japan, as well as in the United States. In general the data
have confirmed the relationship predicted by theory, even though the data are
very imperfect and almost certainly biased toward a zero relationship.184
All of this is not to say that the report's insistence on a most careful case-
by-case (industry-by-industry) approach, which will take full account of the
substantial variation found in the relationship between structure and per-
formance and structure and conduct, is undesirable. But I am most skeptical
of the ability of senior businessmen, who will apparently make up the National
Markets Board, to recognize the problem of the inefficient oligopoly which
does not exhibit consistent excess profits and undesirable trade practices if
they have no a priori theory, supported by respectable empirical studies, to
guide their decision-making.
By enshrining existing market structures and a wide variety of protected
positions as unassailable, and by accepting rather unquestioningly the argument
that Canadian firms can only compete internationally by getting much larger,
the implementation of their proposals will result in a significantly more con-
centrated economy. Since they see little real benefit in tariff reductions as a
means of both forcing firms to be efficient and internationally price-competi-
five, it is not obvious that the benefits of dynamic change will in fact be made
available to consumers. We may end up with a potentially more efficient and
more highly concentrated industrial structure which simply results in higher
profits and/or higher costs from inadequate competitive pressures.
3. The Significance of Mergers
On the basis of empirical evidence both limited and at least 15 years old,
Skeoch and McDonald assert that
it would appear that the general merger movement in Canada has not given rise
to any important consequences for the economy.'8 5
The failure to consider even gross merger behaviour in the decade and one-
half following Reuber and Roseman's work 86 epitomizes their neglect of
available empirical research or their unwillingness to produce any new re-
search of their own. More effort is devoted to a discussion of the Swedish
experience than our own.
Even a brief review of the gross merger data would appear to challenge
the report's conclusion. In every five-year period between 1945 and 1974 the
number of mergers in Canada (foreign and domestic) increased significantly
as can be seen in Table 1.
184 In Goldschmid et. al., eds., supra, note 179 at 231.
185 Supra, note 1 at 56 [emphasis in original].
186 Supra, note 35.
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Table 1
Foreign and Domestic Mergers
in Canada, 1945-1975187
Foreign Domestic Both
Period Total Annual Avg. Total Annual Avg. Total Annual Avg.
1945-49 76 15.2 213 42.6 289 57.8
1950-54 113 22.6 285 57.0 398 79.6
1955-59 271 54.2 427 85.4 698 139.6
1960-64 379 75.8 580 116.0 959 191.8
1965-69 571 114.2 998 199.6 1572 314.4
1970-74 610 122.0 1282 256.4 1892 378.4
1975 prelim. 109 109 155 155 264 264
Between 1945 and 1949 mergers were occurring at a rate of fifty-eight per
year. By 1955-59 the annual average had more than doubled to 140 and by
1965-69 it had more than doubled again to an average of 314 per year. Be-
tween 1970 and 1974 the annual average increased to 378. In the six years
between 1968 and 1973 the number of foreign and domestic mergers in
Canada averaged 417 per year.
Admittedly the data in Table 1 represent only the total number of
mergers. The significance of the six-fold increase in the number of mergers in
Canada in the post-war period is harder to determine. However, the Economic
Council's Interim Report gives us a clue. For the period 1945-1961, the
Council estimated that between eight and seventeen per cent of all mergers
(accounting for thirty-four to forty-nine per cent of the total value of assets
acquired) "might have qualified for a public interest examination."'88 If we
assume the lower percentage is applicable, then between 1970 and 1974 about
thirty mergers per year might have come under examination. This number is
significantly higher than the number actually investigated by the Director of
Investigation and Research. From the data presented, it is not possible to
clearly refute their conclusion, but these statistics appear to suggest a far less
sanguine conclusion than that reached by Skeoch and McDonald.
Having told us on the basis of inadequate knowledge not to take a nega-
tive view of virtually unrestricted merger behaviour of firms in Canada, the
authors have committed the reverse sin. It is not possible to correctly assess
the economic impact of mergers by referring to data at the high level of
aggregation that they do. We need to know at the level of the theoretical in-
dustry what impact mergers have had on both the many faceted industry struc-
ture and on the various dimensions of economic performance. While they do
look at Reuber and Roseman's data at the level of the industry subdivision,
187 Sources: Grant L. Reuber and Frank Roseman, The Take-Over of Canadian
Firms, 1945-61, supra, note 35 at 192; Report of the Director of Investigation and Re-
search, Combines Investigation Act for the year ended March 31, 1976, supra, note 9
at 39.
Iss Supra, note 4 at 86.
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they still fail to relate the number of mergers by "industry" grouping to, for
example, their impact on the level of concentration in theoretical industries.
Why, for example, have they not reviewed at least the published reports of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to see what impact the absence of any
deterrent to mergers in Canada has had? A look at some of these "case
studies" might be useful.
(a) Zinc Oxide89
Prior to 1954 there were only two producers of zinc oxide in Canada; a
third entered in 1954. The market shares, in terms of domestic sales, were as
follows: 9'o
1953 1954 1955 1956
Zinc Oxide Co. 50.6% 53.4% 59.1% 59.8%
Durham Industries 35.5 33.9 23.9 20.4
Canadian Felling - 1.5 9.1 14.2
Imports 13.9 11.2 7.9 5.6
Assisted by discriminatory discounts from its supplier, the Zinc Oxide Co.
engaged in a price war with its rivals between January 1955 and February 1956.
In June 1955 it acquired the shares of Durham Industries and unsuccessfully
tried to acquire Canadian Felling. As a result, the Zinc Oxide Co. accounted
for eighty per cent of domestic sales in 1956.
Regrettably the Director was more concerned about the price discrimina-
tion aspects of the case than he was about the merger. The RTPC gave only
passing mention to the effects of a merger in a three firm industry with high
entry barriers. It did not make any recommendation with respect to the
merger. No prosecution followed.
(b) Yeast' 9 '
In June 1955 Standard Brands acquired Best Yeast Limited, reducing the
number of yeast producers in Canada from three to two. The market shares of
the Canadian producers were as follows:192
1955 1956
Eastern
Dried* Fresh* Totalt Regiont Canada
Standard Brands 86.5% 70.5% 76.0% 80.7% 77.0%
Best Yeast 7.5 7.4 8.8 14.9 6.5
Lallemand 6.0 22.1 15.2 4.4 16.5
shipments
{ sales
189 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Production,
Distribution and Sale of Zinc Oxide (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958).
190 Id. at 166.
191 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Manufacture,
Distribution and Sale of Yeast (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958).
192 Id. at 67, 38-40.
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Following the merger, Standard Brands had become the only manufacturer of
fresh consumers' yeast, and almost the sole producer of both bakers' and con-
sumers' dried yeast in the Eastern Region. In the fresh bakers' yeast market,
in spite of Lallemand's rising share, it still had seventy-five per cent of this
market. Imports were negligible despite modest tariffs.
The director took a structural approach in his appearance before the
RTPC and indicated that there were no economies of production or distribu-
tion to compensate for the reduction in competition.
193
The RTPC was "not convinced that the public interest has been so
affected as to justify recommending action to alter the integration of manu-
facturing operations ... or the dissolution of the merger."' 9 4 They did, how-
ever, recommend that Standard not be permitted to acquire Lallemand or any
new competitor who entered. The Department of Justice did not prosecute.
(c) Vancouver Newspapers' 95
Prior to the merger there had been one morning newspaper (the Herald)
and two evening newspapers (the Province and the Sun) under three inde-
pendent ownerships. The Southam interests bought the Herald and closed it
down. The Sun and Province were merged into Pacific Press.
The result was that the city was left with two papers owned by the same
firm, which was owned equally by Sun Publishing and Southam. Substantial
economies and a stronger morning newspaper were promised.
Large national advertisers were not significantly affected by the combina-
tion advertising policy, but local advertisers were adversely affected. Except
for the increase in rates, local retail advertisers were not significantly affected.
The RTPC concluded that the combined rate was detrimental to local adver-
tisers, but that the increase in rates by the Sun "was nothing exceptional.' 9 6
An agreement was made purportedly to establish and maintain the
editorial independence of the two papers. On the matter of "an independent
press and the public interest" the RTPC noted that, "when all the newspapers
in a city come under single management, then the dangers of a single channel
of communication become clearly evident.' u 7 But the Commission stated it
"must accept the evidence ... that as a business enterprise the Province did
not have prospects of earnings which would lead its owners to continue its
operations indefinitely."' 198
Despite the claim of the general manager of Pacific Press after the
merger, of savings of $500,000 per year, the RTPC found that "An examina-
193 Id. at 3-4.
'94 Id. at 79.
195 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Production and
Supply of Newspapers in the City of Vancouver and Elsewhere in the Province of
British Columbia (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960).
196 Id. at 160.
197 Id. at 171.
198 Id. at 175.
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tion of the monthly and consolidated statements does not reveal any significant
economies because of the consolidation of operations."1 99 But the two papers
jointly did earn higher profits than they had separately. No action was taken.
(d) Meat Packing200
The RTPC report followed an investigation by the Director of Investiga-
tion and Research which arose because of the acquisition in 1955 of Calgary
Packers (the tenth largest meat packer in Canada) and Wilsil Ltd. (the fourth
largest meat packer in Canada) by the largest packing firm, Canada Packers.
Prior to 1955, Canada Packers together with the other two national packers,
Burns and Swift, accounted for over fifty-three per cent of the total com-
mercial slaughter (over sixty per cent of the cattle and over fifty per cent of
the hogs) in Canada. By 1959 the big three accounted for over sixty per cent
of both cattle and hogs. 201 Between 1955 and 1957 Canada Packers and its
subsidiaries accounted for between 28.1 per cent and 29.7 per cent of the
total commercial production of red meats in Canada.20 2 In addition, very de-
tailed evidence was presented showing a high degree of vertical integration by
Canada Packers.203 The firm was the initiator in consulting competitors about
price policy since the early 1930's. It had a history of coercive actions against
competitors in all regions aimed at depressing meat prices or bidding up
cattle prices. Since it was formed in 1927 as a combination of four firms,
Canada Packers' published statements indicated profits much higher than the
average for all firms in the meat-packing industry in Canada and the U.S.204
Plant economies of scale were found not to be significant. Nor were there
significant economies of multiplant operation; the individual plants and
divisions of Canada Packers were found to be run largely as separate busi-
nesses.
205
The RTPC concluded that the two acquisitions
significantly lessened the competition previously existing in the trade in livestock
on the markets where the purchases of Calgary Packers and Wilsil Limited were
made and because of the inter-relationship of markets could be expected to lessen
the competitive effect resulting from such independent buying on Canadian live-
stock markets generally. It also appears to the Commission to be likely that com-
petition in the distribution of meat products was also lessened as a result of such
acquisitions.20
6
The Commission recommended, in light of the Beer and Sugar decisions
207
that a court order be obtained dissolving the mergers, or if unsuccessful, that
an order be obtained prohibiting Canada Packers from making further
3-
9 Id. at 156.
200 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Meat Packing
Industry and the Acquisition of Wilsil Limited and Calgary Packers Limited by Canada
Packers Limited (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1961).
201 Id. at 411.
2 0
2 Id. at 447.
2 0 3 Id., Ch. VII to XIV.
2 0 4 Id. at 389-407.
2 0 5 Id., Ch. XX.
2 0 6 Id. at 427.
2o Supra, notes 40 and 41.
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acquisitions which would lessen competition in the meat packing industry 0 8
After having the report reviewed by two outside counsel the Department of
Justice declined to prosecute.
(e) Acquisition of Wilson Boxes by Bathurst Power and Paper20 9
In 1958 Bathurst and St. Lawrence Corporation, both integrated firms,
accounted for sixty per cent of total shipments of shipping containers in
Eastern Canada and were also important on the Prairies. These two were also
the leading box-board mills. In 1954 Bathurst, St. Lawrence and Hinde and
Dauch (wholly owned by St. Lawrence) supplied seventy-seven per cent of
total domestic shipments made in Canada.2
10
In December 1958, Bathurst bought a minority position in Maritime
Paper Products, one of the two container plants in the region; the other
was Wilson. For twenty years Bathurst and Wilson had an understanding that
the former would have the right of first refusal if Wilson were put up for sale.
In the Maritimes region the respective market shares were as follows:
211
1959 1960
Maritime Paper Products (minority interest 52.4% 47.6%
held by Bathurst)
Wilson Boxes 45.3 38.6
Hygrade 2.4 13.9
In light of the decisions in the only two litigated merger cases, the RTPC
concluded: "On the basis of shipping container production therefore, Bathurst
as a result of acquiring Wilson, was not in a position to carry on its business
virtually free from the influence of competition," 212 despite the fact that it
controlled eighty-six per cent of production in 1960.
The Commission stated that the dissolution of mergers could not be
relied upon to effect the restoration of competitive conditions in the shipping
container industry.213 As in the Shipping Containers Report,21 4 the RTPC
recommended changes be made in tariffs to restore competitive conditions.
The Crown neither prosecuted nor lowered the tariffs.
(f) Propane1 5
The RTPC report was concerned with merger and monopoly by Rockgas
Propane and its parent Great Northern Gas Utilities as well as a combination
208 Supra, note 200 at 430.
209 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Acquisition by
Bathurst Power and Paper Company Limited of Wilson Boxes, Limited (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1962).
2 10 Id. at 4.
211 Id. at 13.
212 Id.
218 Id. at 14.
214 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Manufacture,
Distribution and Sale of Paperboard Shipping Containers and Related Products (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1965).
215 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Monopoly in Distribution of Propane
- British Columbia (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965).
1977]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and conspiracy by Rockgas and Shell to obstruct a new entrant: Western
Propane in the Lower Mainland and Fraser Valley.
Between 1953 and 1961 Rockgas acquired five propane distributions in
B.C.216 One of the acquired firms, Bibby's, was about the same size as
Rockgas and they were in close competition in all major market areas. The
two combined had 90 per cent to 100 per cent of the five major markets in
1956. After Rockgas acquired Bibby's the only competitors were Industrial
Propane in North Burnaby and Duncan Rockgas on Vancouver Island.
Duncan Rockgas was purchased in 1958 leaving Rockgas with a monopoly
on Vancouver Island as Industrial Propane was selling to special use custom-
ers. The result of these acquisitions was to give Rockgas a monopoly position
in several markets.
The RTPC ruled "through their acquisition of competitors, Great
Northern and Rockgas obtained substantial or complete control over the
propane market. ..,217 in five markets at various times between 1957 and
1961. In 1957 these regional markets made up 67.2 per cent of total propane
sales in B.C. However, the RTPC made no recommendations as to the appli-
cation of remedies provided in the Combines Investigation Act. The Crown
did not prosecute.
(g) Cast Iron Soil Pipe2' 8
The RTPC Report was concerned with Anthes Imperial Ltd., the largest
producer in Canada (its share of national market increased from 34.7 per cent
in 1960 to 39.5 per cent in 1962 to 48.7 per cent in 1964) and Associated
Foundry Ltd. (3.98 per cent in 1960, 9.02 per cent in 1963 and 11.11 per
cent in 1964) in which Anthes held shares.
Canadian tariffs effectively insulated the domestic manufacturers. From
1960 to 1965 imports ranged from 0.6 to 2.6 per cent of domestic production.
In late 1962 Associated bought S.P. & F. Foundry Limited giving As-
sociated a virtual monopoly in B.C. In May 1963 Anthes bought a one-sixth
interest in Associated. It increased this to twenty per cent in December 1964
and received a seat on the board of directors.
On the basis that Anthes' share of the market from the Lakehead through
Alberta increased from seventy-two per cent (1960) to seventy-eight per cent
(1963) to ninety-two per cent (1964) the RTPC concluded that "Anthes
was in substantial or complete control of the business of cast iron soil pipe
and fittings manufacture [in the region] in the period January 1, 1952 to June
30, 1965."219 With respect to Anthes' purchase of an interest in Associated
the RTPC stated that it "eliminated possible competition between the two
companies in British Columbia and in the Prairie market."' 2 0 They concluded
216 Id. at 18.
2 17 Id. at 69-70.
218 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Cast Iron Soil Pipe (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1967).
219 Id. at 78.
220 Id. at 87.
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it "was a merger detrimental to the public," and recommended that Anthes
be required to "divest itself of all interest in Associated."' 21
On February 22, 1973 the Crown obtained an Order of Prohibition pre-
venting Anthes from acquiring an interest in Associated (Anthes, after the
release of the RTPC report, had sold its shares) and requiring it to licence
competitors to manufacture its patented mechanical joints.
z2
(h) Discontinued Inquiries
During the period 1960/61 to 1974/75 a random sample of fifty per
cent of the discontinued inquiries of the Director of Investigation and Re-
search, were analyzed in some detail. Listed in Table 2 are data on the
completed mergers which were not challenged by the Director. Because of
confidentiality requirements, the firms, the industry or the year cannot be
identified. The purpose of the list is to indicate, crudely at least, the impact
of such mergers on the level of concentration in the relevant market.
Table 2
Impact of Mergers in Canada,













































Notes: n.a. = not available; m = more than one firm acquired at same time; (i), (ii)
etc. - various regional markets.
221 ld.
2 22 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation
Act for the year ended March 31, 1973, supra, note 9 at 47.
223 Source: This was completed as part of a larger study on the administration and
enforcement of the Combines Investigation Act being conducted by the author and
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While these are but summary statistics, the market share of the firm
resulting from the merger in many of the cases would surely qualify as eco-
nomically significant and worthy of a more detailed investigation. However,
given the unfavourable decisions in the Beer and Sugar cases,2 4 the Director
did not prosecute. In light of the data in Tables 1 and 2, and the seven case
studies discussed above, it seems that the report's assertion that mergers in
Canada have not given rise to important consequences for the economy is
open to serious challenge.
One might add another point to their treatment of mergers. Skeoch and
McDonald see mergers occurring as the result of the pressure of exogenous
market forces impelled by fundamental changes in technology, organization
and shifts in tastes. Yet the drive for size (independently of profitability), the
role of merger promoters, stock market booms, and purely pecuniary tax
considerations all play a prominant role in the analysis of major merger
movements. Reuber and Roseman state that for the period 1945-1961 about
ninety-two percent of the year-to-year variation in the number of foreign
mergers in Canada can be explained by the number of mergers occurring in
the U.S., the supply of internally generated corporate funds in Canada and
the number of commercial failures in Canada.2 5 Only two variables, varia-
tions in Canadian stock market prices and variations in the supply of in-
ternally generated funds in Canada, explain eighty-nine per cent of the year-
to-year variation in the number of domestic mergers.226
The authors place considerable emphasis on the economic benefits as-
sociated with mergers. Reuber and Roseman indicate that "[niegligible or no
economies were reported in fifty-six per cent of the foreign acquisitions and
in forty-one per cent of the domestic acquisitions. ' '27 Of the reported reasons
for the merger, "to achieve economies of scale or to reduce costs" was ranked
as the most important reason in only 1.3 per cent of foreign mergers and 5.0
per cent of domestic mergers. Of all the reasons given, (allowing for multiple
reasons) economies of scale or reduction of costs accounted for 4.7 per cent
of the reasons given for foreign mergers and 7.1 per cent of those for domestic
mergers 8 Where such economies or cost reductions did occur they most
frequently took the form of "economies in administration."' 20 As for the
significance of economies or cost savings Reuber and Roseman conclude that
they were not an important consideration.230
224 Supra, notes 40 and 41.
225 Supra, note 35 at 28. For another view, see C. J. Maule, Anti-Trust and Take-
Over Activity of American Firms in Canada (1968), 11 Journal of Law and Economics
423. Reuber's comment is contained in (1969), 12 Journal of Law and Economics 405;
Maule's rejoinder in (1969), 12 Journal of Law and Economics 419; and Reuber's reply
in (1970), Journal of Law and Economics 257.
22
6 Id. at 29.
227 Id. at96.
228 Id. at 78.
9 Id. at 95.
230 d. at 97.
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Finally, Skeoch and McDonald appear to be incapable of recognizing a
possible divergence between the social desirability of at least some business
combinations and the private benefits accruing only to the participants. As
Milton Moore has pointed out, it is usually assumed that there is an efficiency
basis for corporate mergers: "specifically that the purpose is to increase the
profits of the acquiring company or the two companies both of whom volun-
tarily merge by lowering costs or effecting other economies."2 1 But, he goes
on, "while the profit motive is usually present, it is not necessarily the profit
of shareholders and more importantly that effecting economies in production
is rarely realized or intended... the objectives are increased market power,
the increase or protection of market shares, conglomerate size and diversifi-
cation and sometimes capital gains for those who manage the merger or
engineer the takeover." 2 With respect to the market for business enterprises,
Moore argues:
Almost any evidence supporting the conclusion that the market for companies
operates to the benefit of the public interest is accepted, but proof positive beyond
the peradventure of a doubt is required for evidence of public detriment to be
accepted.233
If the social benefits of mergers are significant, let them be demonstrated
at least in terms of pragmatic predictions. But more importantly, let them be
shared with consumers. Skeoch and McDonald's draft legislation makes no
requirement that the alleged benefits of mergers be passed on to the public
as was the case in Bill C-256. It provided that a merger would not be dis-
solved if it "has led, is leading or likely to lead to a significant improvement
in efficiency.. ." and "a substantial part of the benefits derived or to be de-
rived from such improvement of efficiency are being or are likely to be passed
on by the market or by order of the Tribunal, to the public within a reasonable
time in the form of lower prices or better products."2 4 The weighing of en-
hanced artificial restraints against real-cost economies as the result of a merger
recognizes the double-edged nature of many mergers in this country. But if
we are to tolerate enhanced artificial restraints, the effects of which will be
passed on to the public, we should also insist that the offsetting real-cost
economies also be demonstrably passed on.
4. Mergers and Foreign Ownership
With exception of their brief critique of the Foreign Investment Review
Act,2 one could not tell from reading the Skeoch and McDonald report that
the extensive foreign ownership of the Canadian economy has been a major
231 Milton Moore, "Mergers and Price Agreements," in Canada's Competition Policy
(Ottawa: The Conference Board in Canada, 1972) at 25.
2 32 Id. at 25, 26.,
233 Milton Moore, How Much Price Competition?, supra, note 175 at 10.
234Bill C-256, The Competition Act, first reading June 29, 1971, s. 34(3).
235 Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973-74, c. 46.
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issue in the political economy of the nation in the last decade. Skeoch and
McDonald are oblivious to the issues raised in the Watkins' Report,280 the
Wabn Committee Report,2 7 and the Gray Report.2 38 The same could be said
of the writings of Safarian, 239 Levitt,240 Litvak and Maule,2 41 Hymer,242 and
Rotstein.2 43 The point is that when Skeoch and McDonald argue that take-
overs of Canadian enterprises by foreign firms should be handled in exactly
the same way as domestic mergers with their emphasis on the efficacy of mar-
ket forces, they ignore the trade-off between efficiency and foreign control
many Canadians seem to wish to make. They imply, in the context of a complex,
multi-attribute decision problem, that a dominant solution exists, namely theirs.
They apparently view the preferences of nation states as another artificial
restraint imposed by government upon the inexorable forces of the market,
operating through the multinational and national enterprise, to bring us all
the good things of life through dynamic change. The report argues strongly
against the use of doctrinaire theory and praises informed judgement as a
means of weighing a variety of complex uncertain costs and benefits. Yet, the
authors ignore the issue of foreign ownership, one which the majority of
Canadians would consider most important. They ignore the socio-political
opportunity cost of adopting their merger rules in an economy where foreign
ownership, rightly or wrongly, is an issue which competition policy must take
into account.
236 Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Foreign Own-
ership and the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968).
282 Eleventh Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National
Defence Respecting Canda-U.S. Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).
288 Government of Canada, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa: Infor-
mation Canada, 1972).
239 A. E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry (Toronto: McGraw-
Hill, 1966); , The Performance of Foreign-Owned Firms in Canada (Montreal:
Private Planning Association of Canada, 1969).
2 4 o Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (To-
ronto: Macmillan, 1970).
241 I. A. Litvak and C. J. Maule, eds., Foreign Investment: The Experience of Host
Countries (New York: Praeger, 1970); , The Multinational Firm and Con-
flicting National Interests (1969), 3 Journal of World Trade Law 309; I. A. Litvak, C. J.
Maule and R. D. Robinson, eds., Dual Loyalty: Canadian-U.S. Business Arrangements
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1971).
242 Stephen Hymer, "International Operations of National Firms - A Study of
Direct Foreign Investment," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1960; , "National Policies Toward Multinational Corporations,"
Background Paper for Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry,
supra, note 235.
243 Abraham Rotstein, Continentalism vs. Nationalism (Toronto: The Ontario
Woodsworth Memorial Foundation, 1967); Abraham Rotstein and Gary Lax, eds.,
Independence: The Canadian Challenge (Toronto: The Committee for an Independent
Canada, 1972). Additional contributions in the same vein include, Gunnar Adler-Karls-
son, Reclaiming the Canadian Economy: A Swedish Approach Through Functional
Socialism (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1970); D. W. Carr, Recovering Canadds Nation-
hood (Ottawa: Carr Publishing Company, 1971); D. Godfrey and M. Watkins, eds.,
Gordon to Watkins to You: A Documentary: The Battle for Control of Our Economy
(Toronto: New Press, 1970); W. H. Pope, The Elephant and the Mouse: A Handbook
on Regaining Control of Canadds Economy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).
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5. The Acceptance of Monopoly Power
Characteristic of the authors' conservative approach to competition
policy is their complete acceptance of the existing concentrations of economic
power and protected positions. We are given six reasons why it is not possible
to attack existing centres of market power, but not one argument why it may
be desirable to do so. The status quo with all its attendant effects on efficiency
and distribution is safe, provided the holders of monopoly power do not abuse
it. The approach and the language is remarkably similar to Mackenzie King's
when he introduced the first Combines Investigation Act in 1910:
I would like the House to understand that in introducing this legislation no at-
tempt is being made to legislate against combines, mergers, and trusts as
such.... 24 4
The legislation would permit the examination of firms "where there is reason
to believe that a combine is operating to an undue disadvantage of the
public. ' "24u Note that the disadvantages to the public must become "undue"
before action is to be taken.
As Milton Moore has remarked, a "most formidable barrier to social
change is the disposition to stay with the devil we know rather than the devil
we don't know. The costs of change tend to be overestimated."
246
Having endorsed the abuse theory of monopoly power, Skeoch and
McDonald propose to attack some of its symptoms (undesirable business
conduct) while leaving its fundamental cause (market structure) untouched.
While it is possible that the effective prohibition of conduct restraints may,
given sufficient time, result in a withering away of monopoly power, it
will be a slow process. "Dynamic change" may require the patience of Job.
What about the dominant firm, or group of firms, which does not "create or
enhance significant artificial restraints," but rather exists behind important
product differentiation barriers to entry? This situation would appear to be
beyond the reach of their proposals.
The report's treatment of monopoly and the misuse of dominant position,
including their draft legislation, suffers from a disease identified by one of the
authors in respect of the Interim Report'on Competition Policy. B. C. Mc-
Donald asserted that "the single most striking feature of the Report is the
generality with which it deals with central substantive issues. It is imperative
to generalize, of course, but usually impractical to stop at generalities. '247
Despite this diagnosis and prescription, Skeoch and McDonald's thirty page
discussion of monopoly has but one reference to a specific Canadian case
and that is to a marketing board decision. Their proposed legislation is not
assessed in terms of such significant cases as R. v. Canadian General Electric
244 Cited in L. A. Skeoch, Restrictive Trade Practices in Canada (Toronto: Mc-
Clelland and Stewart, 1966) at 23-24.
24U 1d. at 24.
246Supra, note 175 at 11.
247 Bruce C. McDonald, Canadian Competition Policy: Interim Report of the
Economic Council of Canada (1970), 15 Antitrust Bulletin 529.
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CO. 2 48 Propane,2 49 R. v. K. C. Irving Ltd.,25 0 Zinc Oxide,2r1 R. v. Hoffman-
La Roche Ltd.,252 R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,25s R. v. Allied Chemical
Ltd.,254 Pesticides,255 Erco,2 56 and Ammunition .2 " McDonald's criticism of
the Interim Report is equally appropriate here:
In view of its generality in several areas which cry out for more specific treatment,
the Report has a hollow ring when it pleads for clarity and precision in the law.2 58
The failure to address specific Canadian cases in their analysis of monopoly
and the power of dominant firms is unsatisfactory. The draft legislation is
very general and subject to great discretion in interpretation.
Finally, what are the implications of the National Markets Board's reme-
dial orders? It is highly unlikely that they will strike at the structural charac-
teristics which engender the monopoly power. Rather, one would expect them
to be aimed at prohibiting certain forms of business conduct. It is unlikely
that many of these orders will be effective. To make them effective will require
the kind of detailed intervention and regulation of business actions that
Skeoch and McDonald find most abhorrent. There are simply too many ways
to get around the typical injunction if the benefits of the restraint of trade
are sufficiently alluring.
6. Rationalization, Specialization and Export Agreements
Export agreements are now permitted, with certain exceptions, under
section 32(4) of the Combines Investigation Act.2 9 This provision would
248 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Electric Large Lamps (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1971); R. v. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. (Unreported) Supreme Court
of Ontario, Toronto, September 2, 1976, Bureau of Competition Policy, mimeo 253-1.
249 Supra, note 215.
2 50 R. v. K. C. Irving Ltd. (1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 45; 16 C.C.C. (2d) 49; 13
C.P.R. (2d) 115; 7 N.B.R. (2d) 360. Rev'd. (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157; 23 C.C.C.
(2d) 479; 20 C.P.R. (2d) 193; 11 N.B.R. (2d) 181. Supreme Court of Canada, (Un-
reported), November 16, 1976, Bureau of Competition Policy, mimeo 135-5.
2 51 Supra, note 189.
2 52 R. v. Hoffman-La Roche Limited, (Unreported), Provincial Court (Criminal
Division), Judicial District of York, May 20, 1976, Bureau of Competition Policy,
mimeo 252-1.
2 53 R. v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1973), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 3.
2 54 R. v. Allied Chemical Ltd. (1975), 6 W.W.R. 481.
255 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Distribution and Pricing of Pesticides
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965).
256 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Trade Practices in the Phosphorous
Products and Sodium Chlorate Industries (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).
257 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Report Concerning the Manufacture,
Distribution and Sale of Ammunition in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1959).
25s Supra, note 247 at 543.
259 The exceptions are cases where the conspiracy, combination, agreement or
arrangement (a) has resulted or is likely to result in a reduction or limitation of the
volume of exports of a product; (b) has restrained or injured or is likely to restrain or
injure the export business of any domestic competitor who is not a party to the con-
spiracy; (c) has restricted or is likely to restrict any person from entering into the
business of exporting products from Canada; or (d) has lessened or is likely to lessen
competition unduly in relation to a product in the domestic market. S. 32(5).
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not be affected by the report's proposals in this regard. The trouble with export
agreements is that it is impossible to see how an agreement to fix prices in a
foreign market could possibly result in lower prices to domestic consumers.
Despite the condition that such agreements must not lessen domestic com-
petition unduly, one must be mindful of Adam Smith's maxim that men of
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but
that it ends in a conspiracy against the interest of the public!
By placing the initiative for creating rationalization and specialization
agreements on the firms, Skeoch and McDonald may well be adopting a
cynical, but highly desirable approach. As D. H. W. Henry pointed out in
1969, what businessmen seem to have in mind by such agreements
is some form of agreement or understanding whereby, perhaps with the assistance
of government, the industry, as opposed to individual firms, will somehow be re-
organized on such a basis that the economies of scale are achieved. This... seems
to call for an allocation of markets between the existing firms so that each would
specialize in particular products ... hopefully achieving economies of scale....
Such an agreement, however, would require that the various firms should not step
outside their allocated product or market areas.... In the few proposals that I
have seen, this would result in a virtual monopoly of particular products by par-
ticular firms... [and] would quite clearly raise grave questions under the Com-
bines Act.... 260
Skeoch and McDonald may be cynical, because of the difficulty, without
government initiative or assistance, in formulating such agreements and in
satisfying the constraints they propose. Mr. Henry, whose programme of com-
pliance and "open door" policy put him in a good position to know, has
observed:
This is a field .. . in which there has been a great deal of talk and no action.
Businessmen have extolled in generalities gains to be achieved by this type of
rationalization, but except in a very few cases have not taken the trouble to sit
down and work out exactly what arrangements are both feasible and likely to be
successful.2 61
In the event that a rationalization and specialization agreement does come
forward, it is presumptively legal until challenged by the Director of Investiga-
tion and Research. However, the report does not specify the criteria by which
such agreements are to be appraised. While greater efficiency may be attained,
a laudable allocative objective, what guarantees are there that consumers will
share in the benefits?
7. Basing-Point Pricing
The authors underestimate the significance of delivered pricing schemes
(including basing-point systems) as devices to facilitate oligopolistic coordina-
260 D. H. W. Henry, Mergers, Rationalization and Specialization Agreements
(1969), 8 Western Ontario Law Review 123 at 131-32.
201 Id. at 132. For an example of business' views on rationalization and specializa-
tion agreements see, Douglas I. W. Bruce, "Rationalization and Foreign Ownership
under Bill C-256," in Canada's Competition Policy, supra, note 231 at 34 and 39. An
academic's view is given by H. E. English, "Specialization and Export Agreements:
Their Potentials and Limitations," in L. A. Skeoch, ed., Canadian Competition Policy,
supra, note 21 at 28.
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tion in the form of uniform delivered prices. Such schemes are most significant
when the number of basing points is much smaller than the number of plants,
where the product is homogeneous (or nearly so) and where freight costs
are a significant part of the delivered price. Moore argues that "mandatory
f.o.b. pricing be made applicable only where the freight cost exceeds 5 per cent
of the wholesale price. '2 2 Skeoch and McDonald are too quick to reject
mandatory f.o.b. pricing or at least requiring that the buyer have the option.
Professor Moore asserts:
[Miandatory f.o.b. pricing would create conflicts of interests among the members
of an oligopoly industry, which would tend to weaken the adherence to cooperative
pricing practices and thus introduce some degree of price competition. A firm
could not increase its sales except by decreasing its milldoor prices.
All forms of basing-point pricing result in wasteful cross-hauling.... Basing-
point pricing often imposes obstacles in the way of the attraction of additions to
plant capacity to their least-cost locations.26
Having carefully reviewed the issue of conscious parallelism in Canadian
combines cases, 264 it is apparent that basing-point and related delivered
pricing schemes are an integral part of the serious problem of non-collusive
oligopolies. In R. v. Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd.,2 65 Camblin, Prov. Ct. 3.
indicated that prior to the mutual adoption of a basing-point pricing scheme
price competition was active. As he put it, "one finds the marketing arrange-
ments to be in a somewhat chaotic condition due, among other problems, to
the incongruous freight allowances. '203 In R. v. Armco Canada Ltd.,6 7 price
competition was eliminated for almost four years following the adoption of an
open pricing policy coupled with delivered pricing in three zones in Ontario.
Mr. Justice Lerner stated:
[the] producers divided Ontario into three zones and all prices quoted were a
"delivered" price in each zone rather than FOB plant. All prices were uniform in
any zone regardless of the distance of the plant of the particular manufacturer
from the geographical point of delivery.26 8
In the recent case of R. v. Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd.,20 9 all six
Eastern refiners, led by the big three with ninety per cent of the market,
used basing-point pricing. Three cities where the major refineries are located,
Toronto, Montreal and St. John act, as basing-points. For all practical
purposes, identical delivered prices prevail throughout the country as B.C.
Sugar, which has a monopoly from Manitoba west, uses the same system.
The system was defended by Mackay J.:
The abolition of the basing point pricing and freight absorption system would
probably result in Atlantic's confinement to the Maritimes, St. Lawrence com-
262 Supra, note 175 at 165.
2 63 Id. at 166.
204W. T. Stanbury and G. B. Reschenthaler, Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism:
Theory, Policy and the Canadian Cases (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming).
265 (1973), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 14.
2 6 6 1d. at 14.
207Supra, note 112.
268 1d., (1975), 6 O.R. (2d) at 565.
269 R. v. Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd., (Unreported), Superior Court of
Quebec (Criminal), December 19, 1975, Bureau of Competition Policy, mimeo 243-1.
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peting with Redpath only in Quebec, and the latter in sole control of the lucrative
Ontario market. Whatever be the validity of the criticism of this system as it
operates in the United States, by such eminent American economic authorities as
Messrs. Joel Dean and F. M. Scherer, who believed that it is preferable to restrict
manufacturers to their own manufacturing areas, we in Canada believe that manu-
facturers in the Atlantic Provinces and in the West ought to have access to the
lucrative Quebec and Ontario markets, access which is but only imperfectly
achieved by the basing point and freight absorption system. Judicial support for
the system may be found in the B.C. Sugar Case . . . and in Regina v. Canada
Cement Lafarge .... 270
At the very least, delivered pricing schemes ought to be a reviewable
trade practice such as refusal to supply, consignment selling, market restriction
etc. Why should it be necessary, as Skeoch and McDonald propose, to first
convict a group of firms of a conspiracy to lessen competition unduly before
finding that oligopolistic coordination is facilitated by such schemes?
8. Administration and Adjudication
By far the most praiseworthy proposal advanced by the report is its
strong recommendation that civil procedures be introduced into the imple-
mentation of competition policy. The concept, structure, and powers of the
specialized adjudicating body are generally unobjectionable. It is time that
the analysis of the cases and the remedies made economic sense. After all,
these are economic offences in restraint of trade. The authors' insistence that
the Board operate with the benefit of a clear statement of objectives, as
difficult as they may be to implement in practical terms, makes a policy
analyst's heart warm. However, some of the details of their proposals might
be questioned.
First, apparently in a desire to make "the tribunal" acceptable to busi-
nessmen, Skeoch and McDonald wish to see the majority of the Board com-
prised of business executives. Who else will have the requisite "extensive
private sector experience" and will have the necessary "informed common
sense," rather than simply "cloistered expertise"? Academics specializing in
the field of industrial organization and competition policy might find it hard
not to feel defensive about the report's repudiation of their kind. At last report
the distinguished professors sitting on the Monopolies Commission in the
U.K. were not thought to be wildly impractical and incapable of understanding
the ways of the business world. Skeoch and McDonald's emphasis on having
businessmen on the NMB seems to fall prey to what Robert Solo has called
"the myth of the borrowed businessman."
In times of trouble when society demands action and politicians need guidance,
there will always come, according to the myth, the good dollar-a-year man to be
borrowed from business to do the job. He knows his stuff. Only ask his advice, or
bring him in and turn him loose. Make a "czar" of him. In his goodwill, skill, and
wisdom, he is sure to put things right.
In sum, when the politicians are finally cornered and the President is at the end
of his tether, and the answers cannot be found either in the law books or at the
polls, then the "know-how" that is required to plan for and deal with the or-
2 7 id. at 96.
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ganizational sector can always be borrowed from or hired out of the entities that
compose that sector.2 71
Without at least some theoretical economic expertise how will the Board
be able to implement, for example, the proposed criteria for determining
whether price discrimination has occurred? They define it to be when sales
are made "at less than the reasonably anticipated long-run average cost of
production and distribution '2 72 and where such sales have adversely affected
competition. Where informed judgement and considerable discretionary powers
are to be exercised it does not seem unreasonable that at least a significant
minority of the NMB have a strong conceptual and analytical bent coupled
with a modicum of specialized knowledge. But the issue is more general as
Solo points out:
More fundamentally, the competence itself - the knowledge, skills, and outlook
as these develop; and the strategies of action and the criteria of choice as these
are learned through the experience of business management and agency operations,
or ingrained through training and in the winnowing process of recruitment and
promotion - is of a wholly different character and quality than that which is
needed for social and economic planning and control in the public interest. Both
the operations manager and the social-economic planner will require some mastery
of the relevant technologies, and of the sciences related to them, but the two
capabilities need to develop separately in the context of different outlooks oriented
toward different purposes, drawing upon different reference values, and incorporat-
ing different criteria of evaluation.
2 78
Skeoch and McDonald would, of course, reject the notion that members
of the NMB will be "social-economic planners." Yet they will have great
discretion in their interpretation of legislation which is expressed in rather
general terms. The potential impact of their decisions, for good or evil, will
be significant. Is it desirable that the views of "practical businessmen" be
given this much weight?
Second, one wonders whether prohibition orders and even remedial
orders are sufficient remedies to make restraints of trade unprofitable. If a
firm or group of firms can reap substantial economic gains before they are
investigated, "tried," and made subject to a prohibition order, is the latter
sufficient to both stop the undesirable behaviour and to deter other potential
offenders or repetition of the offence? Will the economic sanctions available
to the NMB be sufficient? Elsewhere, this writer has argued that "crime," in
the form of illegal restraints of trade, is profitable.27 4 Can the Board's conduct-
oriented remedies be enforced in practical terms? Who will oversee its orders?
If the supervision of consent decrees in the U.S. is any guide we should not
be optimistic about the proposed procedures.
276
271 Robert A. Solo, The Political Authority and the Market System (Cincinnati:
South-Western Publishing Co., 1974) at 304. By the "organizational sector," Solo is
referring to "large scale manufacturing where the primary producing-distributing
agencies are very large corporations, each employing many thousands of persons."
272 Supra, note 1 at 217-18.
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Third, the authors' discussion of private civil actions, including class
actions,'2 7 is disappointing. While refusing to get drawn into a proper debate
on the efficacy of such actions in regard to the deterrence of restraints of
trade and the prevention of unjust enrichment, they nevertheless specify a
number of their concerns over such procedures and urge great caution in
implementing them.
Care must be taken that [private civil actions] not be structured on the basis of
oversimplified notions of pricing processes, the working of markets and the ap-
plication of business revenues, lest some enormously difficult questions calling for
quite arbitrary judgments be imposed upon the courts.
2 77
Again, the whole tone of their discussion is overwhelmingly negative. Because
the issues are complex, the status quo is not to be disturbed. On this point
McDonald's earlier criticism of the Economic Council is applicable: "the
Report is somewhat unimaginative on the subject of enforcement and reme-
dies. There is practically no discussion of the role private initiative can play
in the total enforcement effort ... "278
Fourth, Skeoch and McDonald have endorsed the Department of
Justice's monopoly on the initiation of criminal prosecutions in the Federal
government on the grounds that it may be used too aggressively by single-
minded investigators and policymakers. But how is the public, the victim of
illegal restraints of trade, to be protected against the demonstrated lack of
enthusiasm of the Department of Justice for combines cases or their extensive
capacity to repeatedly "review" and delay justifiable prosecutions? It is
apparent that senior officials in the Bureau of Competition Policy have been
frustrated by Justice's diffidence and delay in pressing cases. Combines work
forms a very small proportion of Justice's total workload. The small absolute
number of such cases (excluding misleading advertising cases) per year means
that few Crown prosecutors have much knowledge in the area or much sympa-
thy for combines cases. As such cases are usually complex (e.g., requiring
lawyers to become familiar with certain aspects of economics) and frequently
protracted, they reduce the apparent "output" of Crown lawyers. Competition
policy cases would be better served by having the Director of Investigation
and Research develop a small specialized legal staff (together with selected
outside counsel) and permitting him to lay charges directly. If he oversteps
his prosecutorial role and brings cases without merit no doubt the judges at
the Preliminary Hearings will make this point painfully apparent. At the very
least, the Director ought to be able to proceed to court on his own if the
Department of Justice takes an inordinate amount of time to decide on
whether it should proceed.
Fifth, in their proposal to allow appeals to the Cabinet within sixty days
on any order of the National Markets Board, Skeoch and McDonald are
inviting the companies affected by the order to marshal their lobbying and
public opinion forces to reverse rulings which are likely to have a significant
27 Supra, note 1 at 324-27.
2
77ld. at 324-25.
278 Supra, note 247 at 538.
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impact. We will observe the pushing and shoving of organized interest groups
as such "raw political questions" are resolved.2 79 Appeals on the grounds pro-
vided by the Federal Court Act are necessary and desirable, but in the report's
own words, it would "risk defeating the entire purpose of the specialized
Board to permit [the Cabinet] to substitute [its] views as to proper judgments
concerning... the design of the remedy. '280 If the cumulative irritation with
the decisions of the Board is sufficient, it will be abolished or significantly
modified by the Government, existing or newly elected. In the meantime
responsibility should remain with the Board.
E. SUMMARY
The criticisms articulated in the last half of this paper should be placed
in a larger context. Compared to existing legislation and its operational im-
pact, the report's proposals with respect to mergers, monopoly and the market
power of dominant firms, price discrimination and the process of administra-
tion and adjudication represent a desirable set of changes. While they move
in the right direction, they do not go far enough. A close reading of the
litigated cases, RTPC reports, the inquiries discontinued by the Director, the
Canadian empirical work in industrial organization and various studies of
Canadian industries makes it clear that a stronger approach to competition
policy is warranted.
279 See, W. T. Stanbury, Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Cornpeti-
tion Policy, 1971-1975 (Toronto: Methuen, 1977).
280 Supra, note 1 at 310.
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